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HEADQUARTERS ARMY GROUND FORCES
ARMY WAR COLLEGE
Washington 25, D.C.

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by

SUBJECT: Report on the Okinawa Operation.

TO : Commanding General, Army Ground Forces, Army War College, Washington 25, D. C.

1. MISSION. Having been detailed as an observer for the Pacific Ocean Area by War Department Letter Order, dated 15 February 1945, [redacted] E. S. JOHNSTON [redacted] was directed by Army Ground Forces to collect information on staff procedure, training, organization, equipment, supply, tactics, and technique with particular attention to infantry matters. In the event I was afforded an opportunity to observe a unit engaged in the conduct of an operation, I was further directed to collect such information on the subjects mentioned above as will be of value in training other units to conduct a similar operation.

2. ITINERARY. I reported as directed to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet; Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas; and Commanding General, Tenth Army in that order at Oahu on 27 February 1945. I was briefed, provided with the Tentative Operations Plan for the Okinawa Operation and directed to proceed to Leyte. I reported to Commanding General, XXIV Corps at Leyte on 3 March 1945 and was assigned as assistant Corps G-3. I observed the preparations for and went with the Corps on this operation.

3. SCOPE OF REPORT. This report covers the period 3 March 1945 to 9 April 1945, inclusive. It is based on interviews with officers and enlisted men of all units in XXIV Corps, both while the Corps was at Leyte and Okinawa as well as personal observations. The opinions and recommendations contained herein in every case are those of at least several qualified individuals.

4. MISSION OF TENTH ARMY.

a. Task. The Tenth Army as expeditionary troops for this operation, initially under command of the Commander, Joint Expeditionary Force, was to assist in the capture, occupation, defense and development of Okinawa Island and establish control of the sea and air in the Nansei Shoto (Ryukyu) Area; with the eventual aim of expanding control of the Nansei Shoto by capturing, defending and developing additional positions.

b. Phases. (See Inclosure #1a for Sketch).

(1) Phase I.

(a) On L-6 Day the islands of Kerama Retto were to be captured for use as an advance naval anchorage and seaplane base.

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14. ABSTRACT
This report covers the operation of the XXIV Corps, the 7th and 96th Divisions, while under combat conditions during the campaign for Okinawa

15. SUBJECT TERMS

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(b) Not later than L-1 Day the islands of Keise were to be captured and heavy artillery emplaced thereon for operations on Okinawa.

(c) Landings were to be made on L Day on the western shore of Okinawa with corps abreast, XXIV Corps on the right. Each corps, less one division in Tenth Army Reserve, was to land with divisions abreast.

(d) One army reserve division was to feint a landing on the southeastern shore of Okinawa on L and L + 1 Days.

(2) Phase II.

Ie Shima was to be seized, such portion of northern Okinawa occupied as would be necessary to establish control of the entire island and to develop additional base facilities in favorable localities.

(3) Phase III.

Our positions were to be exploited in the Nansei Shoto by seizing and developing additional islands in the group.

5. TIME AND DATE. L Day was tentatively set as 1 April 1945, east longitude date. "H" hour was tentatively set as 0830I (local time). Any corrections were to be announced to commanders shortly before embarkation of the assault forces.

6. PRELIMINARY BOMBARDMENT. All landing operations in the Nansei Shoto were to be preceded by shore based air, naval air, and surface bombardments of objectives in Formosa, the Nansei Shoto, and the Kyushu-Western Honshu area.

a. The Naval Gunfire Support Plan was of necessity a very detailed one, providing for effective support of the Expeditionary Force regardless of whether the Preferred or Alternate Plan was ordered executed. The fact that fast carriers, minesweepers, underwater demolition craft, transports and other combat ships; a total of some 1400 ships, would be operating in waters adjacent to the target area, made it imperative that careful and coordinated plans be made so as to insure maximum efficiency.

b. Okinawa was to be bombed by shore based planes prior to the arrival of the Amphibious Support Force. On L-8 it was to be bombarded by carrier based planes and fast battleships of Task Force 58. Other bombardments by this Task Force were to be designated by the Commander, Task Force 52.

c. Underwater demolition teams were to undertake reconnaissance and demolition on the main and demonstration beaches concurrent with the bombardment, commencing on L-4.

d. The plan called for supporting the capture of Okinawa by sustained neutralization, destruction, counter-battery and harassing bombardments commencing on L-7: by intensive close support of the landings on Kerama Retto, Keise Shima, and Okinawa; by bombardments for supporting the diversionary feint at the landing near Sakibaru Saki; and thereafter by delivering call, deep supporting, counter-battery, illumination and harassing fires. The plan also provided for the destruction of shore installations for firing torpedoes. Finally, it aimed to prevent the movement by sea of enemy troops for support or evacuation of the position.

e. For this purpose the Amphibious Support Force under the command of Rear Admiral Blandy (until 0600 on L Day when Vice Admiral Turner was to assume command) was divided into five fire support groups.

(1) Fire Support Unit One.
(Rear Admiral Fischler)

BB #1	Texas
BB #10	Arkansas
CA #1	Chester
CA #2	Tuscaloosa
DD #1	Laws (F Des Div 110)
DD #2	Longshaw
DD #3	Morrison
DD #4	Pritchett (FD)

(2) Fire Support Unit Two.
(Rear Admiral Joy)

BB #2	Maryland
BB #3	Colorado
CA #4	San Francisco
CA #5	Minneapolis (F)
DD #5	Hall (F Des Div 101)
DD #6	Halligan (FD)
DD #7	P. Hamilton
DD #8	Laffey
DD #9	Twiggs

(3) Fire Support Unit Three.
(Rear Admiral Deyo)

BB #4	Tennessee (F TF 54)
BB #5	Nevada
CA #6	Wichita (F Cru Div 4)
CL #1	Birmingham (F)
CL #2	Mobile
DD #10	M. L. Abele (FD)
DD #11	Zellars
DD #12	Bryant (FD)
DD #13	Barton (F Des Div 119)
DD #14	O'Brien

(4) Fire Support Unit Four.
(Rear Admiral Rodgers)

BB #6	West Virginia (F Bat Div 4)
BB #7	Idaho (F)
CA #7	Portland
CA #8	Pensacola
CL #3	Biloxi
DD #15	Porterfield (F Des Div 109)
DD #16	Callaghan
DD #17	C. Young (FD)
DD #18	Irwin
DD #19	Preston

(5) Fire Support Unit Five
(Rear Admiral Smith)

BB #8	New Mexico
BB #9	New York
CA #9	Indianapolis
CA #10	Salt Lake City (F)
DD #20	H. L. Edwards
DD #21	Newcomb (F Des Div 111)
DD #22	Leutze
DD #23	R. P. Leary
DD #24	Bennion (FD)

f. The Target Priority Schedule was broken down into four priorities.

(1) First Priority. Installations which threaten ships, aircraft, and underwater demolition team operations. Specific targets, in order of importance, were to be: any battery, including torpedo tubes and rocket projectors, which opens fire on our ships or planes; coast defense guns; dual purpose guns; heavy AA; automatic AA; covered artillery emplacements within effective range of ships on landing beaches; open artillery emplacements where the presence of guns is confirmed by observation, if within effective range of ships or landing beaches; AT guns on or near the landing beaches; ships, barges, or boats.

(2) Second Priority. Installations which threaten assault forces in the ship-to-shore movement and landing. Specific examples of these targets, in order of importance were to be: blockhouses and substantial buildings; pillboxes; seawalls fronting on the landing beaches with the stipulation that at least two breaches were to be made per beach; command posts; unidentified installations; earth covered structures; areas of heavy growth.

(3) Third Priority. Installations which threaten or oppose landing force operations after the landing, or which affect the ability of the enemy to continue resistance. These, in order of importance, were to be: ammunition storage; storage areas; fuel dumps; camps or bivouac areas; communication centers and facilities; traffic which is of sufficient quantity and type to insure probable damages; urban areas; railroad centers and inland road junctions.

(4) Fourth Priority. Installations which should not be fired at prior to L Day. In order of importance they were to be: unoccupied rifle pits, foxholes, and fire trenches; open artillery emplacements when presence of guns is not established by observation; empty revetments; antitank trenches or sections of trenches; barbed wire.

(5) Bridges were not to be fired upon except with the specific approval of Commander, Task Force 52.

g. The Schedule of Fire was written up in table form.

(1) Tables were drawn up for each day commencing with L-7 to include L + 1 Day.

(2) They listed the number of Fire Support Unit, the ship number, the major caliber to be used; what the ship was to fire at (or to do) and at what time (as the table divided each day into hours from 0700 to 1900).

(3) Separate tables were computed for the schedule of fires on L-6 Day for Yakaba Shima, Kuba Shima, Aka Shima, Geruma Shima, Hokaji Shima and Zamami Shima; on L-5 for Amuro Shima and Tokashiki Shima.

(4) A sketch showing the positions of DD's, LCI's, LSM's; the routes to be taken by LVT's and LCVP's on L-6 and L-5 around the smaller islands was attached to the plan.

(5) Separate tables were made for the Northern Attack Force and the Southern Attack Force for L Day with sketches showing the positions to be taken by combat ships of the fire support groups.

h. Although they were not included in the Schedule of Fire Plan, it must be borne in mind that a sizeable number of gunboat support craft, landing craft support; mortar support craft, RCM's and rocket craft, landing ship medium (rocket) were to add to the planned fires described above.

7. TROOP LIST.

a. For complete Troop List see Inclosure #2.

b. In general, the troops employed were as follows:

(1) Assault Echelon.

(a) Tenth Army Troops.
(b) III Amphibious Corps.

1. Corps Troops.
2. 1st Marine Division Reinforced.
3. 6th Marine Division Reinforced.

(c) XXIV Corps.

1. Corps Troops.
2. 7th Infantry Division Reinforced.
3. 96th Infantry Division Reinforced.

(d) Reserves for Assault Echelon.

1. 77th Infantry Division Reinforced.
2. 2nd Marine Division Reinforced (Floating Reserve).
3. 27th Infantry Division Reinforced (Floating Reserve).

(e) Naval Forces.
(f) Tactical Air Force.

1. 2nd Marine Air Wing.

(g) Island Command Troops.

(2) For troops in echelons subsequent to the assault see Inclosure #2.

8. TARGET. For description of the target, see Inclosure #4.

9. THE PLANNING PHASE.

a. Inasmuch as I was with the XXIV Corps, I have confined this section to a discussion of the XXIV Corps; but as the 77th Infantry Division had several difficult missions of interest mainly to the infantry which in its results provided many important lessons in smaller amphibious landings, island sweeping, reboating, reorganization, and relanding on another island, the plans drawn up by this Division are also included.

b. XXIV Corps. The Corps drew up two plans; the preferred plan being to land on the western coast of Okinawa with two divisions simultaneously with the III Amphibious Corps, our Corps being on the south flank. The alternate plan was to land on the east coast of Okinawa north of the III Amphibious Corps. The preferred plan was the one which was executed and so the details regarding the alternate plan have been omitted.

c. Corps Preferred Plan. (See Inclosure #1b, Operations Sketch).

(1) The XXIV Corps was to land at "H" hour on "L" Day on beaches south of Hagushi, secure the Kadena airfield, coordinate its advance with III Amphibious Corps on indicated progress lines along the boundary between corps, secure the objective line marked L + 10 at the earliest practicable time, protect the south flank of the operation, and advance to succeeding objective lines (after the L + 10 line) on order of the Commanding General, Tenth Army.

(2) The 7th Infantry Division was to land at "H" hour on "L" Day with two regiments abreast on beaches Purple and Orange. It was to advance rapidly inland, secure the Kadena airfield, secure the objective line L + 10 in its zone of action as soon as possible, and be prepared to continue the attack to the south along the east coast of Okinawa on Corps order. It was to coordinate its advance with III Amphibious Corps on indicated progress lines. After the Division was ashore, it was to hold one infantry regiment in Division reserve ashore to be committed only on Corps authority.

(3) The 96th Infantry Division (minus 382nd Infantry in Corps Reserve) was to land at "H" hour on beaches White and Brown on "L" Day, capture the commanding hills along the line Sunabi-Suzugawa-Hill 102 and seize the western and northern crests of the hill mass south of the line Sunabi-Fuensan-Kuba. It was to secure its portion of the L + 10 line as soon as possible, seize the river crossings immediately north and south of Chatan, protect the Corps right (south) flank, establish and maintain contact with and coordinate

with the 77th Infantry Division along progress lines indicated on the Operations Sketch.

(4) The only unusual use of artillery was to be that of the 420th Field Artillery Group, which was to land with elements of the 77th Infantry Division on Keise Shima, and support the Okinawa attack, giving particular attention to the area Oroku-Naka-Shima Buku-Kue. All artillery with corps were to be prepared to support the defense of the beachhead against water-borne counterlandings.

(5) 77th Infantry Division (Special Task Force).

(a) The 77th Infantry Division, reinforced, was under control of Commanding General, Western Islands Attack Group and beginning on L-6 was to rapidly sweep through Kerama Retto and Keise Shima clearing hostile forces therefrom. The Division was to be prepared to clear hostile forces from Tonaki Jima on order of CTG-51.1 (Commanding General, Western Islands Attack Group).

The 77th Division was also to be prepared to furnish the necessary troops for the protection of naval underwater demolition teams when they prepare passages through the reefs on Keise Shima between L-5 and L-1.

The third mission assigned to the 77th Division was to furnish minimum necessary garrison forces for the protection of the Radio Intercept, Aircraft Warning Service Teams, Weather Detachment, and the Joint Expeditionary Force Small Boat Pool to be established on Zamami Shima.

The fourth mission was to land two 155-mm gun battalions on Keise Shima and furnish minimum garrison force for the security thereof.

Lastly, upon completion of the first mission listed above, the Division was to reembark (less its garrison detachments) and be prepared for further operations on order.

(b) The Division thereupon drew up 8 operation plans. (The alternate plans not used are omitted).

Operation Plan I.
Capture and Defense of Kerama Retto
Preferred Plan

In this Plan:

RCT 305:

1. Was to land BLT (Battalion Landing Team) 2 at "M" hour, L-6 Day on Yakibi Shima, have it advance rapidly inland, clear the island of hostile forces, be prepared to reboat and move on order of the RCT Commander by shore-to-shore movement to Zamami Shima.

2. Was to land BLT 1 at M + 30 hours, L-6 Day on Zamami Shima, have it advance rapidly inland, clear all hostile enemy forces therefrom, and be prepared to reboat on order of the RCT Commander.

3. Was to land BLT 3 at "M" hour, L-6 Day on Aka Shima, have it advance rapidly inland, clear hostile forces therefrom, and be prepared to reboat on order of the RCT Commander.

4. Was to land on order of the RCT Commander at Zamami Shima a garrison force composed of: BLT 2; Battery D, 7th AA (AW) Battalion; Detachment 62, 7th Weather Squadron; Detachment Aircraft Warning Service 7; Provisional Radio Intelligence Company (-); Detachment B-9 Military Government; 6th G-10 Dispensary.

5. Was to land on order of the RCT Commander elements of BLT 1 on Amuro Shima, have them advance rapidly inland, clear all hostile resistance therefrom, and be prepared to reboat on order of the RCT Commander.

RCT 306:

1. Was to land BLT 3 at "M" hour, L-6 Day on Kuba Shima, have it advance rapidly inland, clear hostile forces therefrom, and be prepared to reboat on order of the RCT Commander.

2. Was to land BLT 1 at "M" hour, L-6 Day on Geruma Shima, have it advance rapidly inland, clear the hostile forces therefrom, and be prepared to reboat on order of the RCT Commander for a subsequent landing on Tokashiki Shima.

3. Was to land BLT 2 at "M" hour, L-6 Day on Hokaji Shima, have it advance rapidly inland, clear the hostile forces therefrom, and be prepared to reboat on order of the RCT Commander for a subsequent landing on Tokashiki Shima.

RCT 307 was to be prepared to land elements in support of landings of RCT 305 and 306 on division order.

Reconnaissance elements of the Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion, First Marine Force, Pacific were to land on Aware Saki, Mae Shima, and Kuro Shima on the nights of L-5 and L-4, and notify the division commander if unable to clear them.

The next operational plan was drawn up for the seizure of Keise Shima, clearing hostile forces from the islands, landing two 155-mm gun battalions thereon, and furnishing the minimum necessary garrison force for security thereof.

Operational Plan II
Capture and Defense of Keise Shima

1. RCT 305 (-BLT 2) was to remain afloat.

2. RCT 306:

   a. Was to land BLT 2 at H2 hour, L-1 Day on Keise Shima, have it advance rapidly inland and clear all hostile forces from the islands.

   b. Remainder of the RCT was to remain afloat.

3. RCT 307 was to remain afloat.

4. When the Commanding Officer, RCT 306 informed the Commanding Officer, 420th Field Artillery Group that the islands were secure, the Group was to land and carry out their Corps mission.

5. Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion FMF-PAC (First Marine Force, Pacific) on the night of L-6, L-5 was to land on Nagannu Shima and the two islands Kamiyama Shima (Keise Shima) to determine the presence or absence of enemy and to protect the naval underwater demolition teams.

Operational Plan III was the plan to be used if and when the 77th Infantry Division, reinforced, was given the mission of clearing hostile forces from Tonaki Jima on orders CTG-51.1 (Commanding General Western Islands Attack Group).

RCT 305:

1. BLT 3 was to land on Tonaki Jima on order, advance rapidly inland, clear all hostile forces from the island, and be prepared to reboat on order of the RCT Commander.

2. RCT 305 (-BLT 3) was to continue on missions assigned in Operation Plan I.

3. RCT 306 was to continue on missions assigned in Operations Plans I and II.

RCT 307:

1. One BLT was to be prepared to land on Tonaki Jima on order, advance rapidly inland clearing all hostile forces from the island, and be prepared to reboat on order of the RCT Commander.

2. RCT 307 (-one BLT) was to continue on missions assigned in Operations Plans I and II.

All other divisions and attached units were to continue on missions assigned in Operations Plans I and II.

(c) The rest of the operation plans have not as yet been executed and so are omitted.

(d) In the planning, stress was laid on the necessity of vigorous aggressiveness by all units. Disorganization of enemy units early in the attack was to be the guiding rule of every commander. Division commanders and shore party commanders were to have control of their unit's defenses in case of airborne attack which was expected.

(e) G-2 Plans.

1. Photo coverage was to be done daily between 1500-1700 from L to L + 5 to a depth of three miles behind the enemy lines and three miles south of the line Sunabi-Awashi. Six complete sets of these pictures were to be given to Corps and additional prints provided for interested units. A photo plane was to be assigned to Corps for special missions.

2. Each division (7th, 77th, 96th) was to have three trained observers aboard carriers to fly in high performance observation aircraft to look for enemy

troop concentrations and defensive works. They were not to be used for artillery spotting.

3. Stress was placed upon the value of capturing the enemy 32nd Army Headquarters intact. Only Tenth Army personnel were to search it and were to be notified by urgent message of its capture.

4. Plans called for several million propaganda leaflets to be placed aboard carriers for distribution during the period L-7 to L + 10 for the purpose of getting civilians up into the hills and away from the scene of combat.

5. The troops were not oriented until their ship was headed directly for the target area. The orientation was confined to Phase I and included the following:

a. Geography and History of Okinawa.

b. Strength and composition of enemy forces, to include enemy capabilities of counter-attacking by air and amphibious forces.

c. Strength and composition of our own forces, to include ground, air and naval units, and the identity of commanders of Expeditionary Force elements.

d. General plan of attack for Phase I.

e. Surface and air support for amphibious assault.

f. Mission of the unit being oriented.

g. Instructions regarding trigger happiness, pilferage, indescriminate AA firing, captured property and equipment, priority on roads, countersigns, and daily maintenance and care of equipment.

h. Current world events; general background material on the causes of the war and the importance of Allied victory.

i. Military Government.

Orientation officers were appointed for each ship coordinated with captain of the ship so as to employ shipboard facilities to the maximum. In many cases, the ship's public address system was used. A

three field hospitals while the remaining one was attached to the 7th Infantry Division. The consultant's job was that of supervision of the whole plan while the seven other officers were to make it operate.

Mission.

The purpose of the plan was to reestablish a psychological equilibrium and to create a wish to return to duty on the part of the soldier who has been a psychiatric case. Those in charge realized that their mission included four salient features: First, they must convince the soldier that he can do his job; second, they must convince him that he isn't afflicted with any mental disease; third, that he can regain his self-respect; and fourth, that he can maintain the respect of his outfit. It was felt that unless all four of these points were put across effectively the plan would not be a success.

3. Operation of the Plan.

A psychiatric case first is brought to the battalion aid station. If the situation allows it, the battalion surgeon will be advised in his psychiatric work by the division psychiatrist who will function between the division clearing company and the battalion aid station. Now the battalion surgeon screens his patients into medical, surgical and psychiatric cases. If the situation permits, the battalion surgeon will keep mild psychiatric cases for 12 to 24 hours, giving them simply therapy - rest, fluids and mild sedation. The more serious cases, plus those which the battalion surgeon finds he cannot hold are evacuated to the clearing company. Incidentally, the diagnosis put on the patient's ticket by the battalion surgeon will be "exhaustion" and not "psychiatric" for psychological reasons.

When the patient gets to the clearing company, the division psychiatrist takes charge of him. Moderate cases are held at the clearing company for from 3 to 5 days. These moderate cases get general therapy, consisting of a shower, if possible, a change of clothes, hot food, and drugs to put them to sleep for 24-48 hours which will knock out the battle stimuli. During this period of sleep the patients are awakened in order to feed them food and plenty of fluids. At the end of this

sleep, the patients are given reassurance, suggestion, and a general morale build-up by group discussion as well as individual psychotherapy. The patients are used around the clearing station for fatigue tasks such as digging foxholes, acting as male nurses, etc. At the end of 5 days, those patients who are deemed ready are sent back to duty. At this point a psychiatric diagnosis is first made. Those patients needing an additional 3 to 5 days and the more serious cases are sent to the field hospital which is backing up the clearing company.

The patient whom the psychiatrist feels is not susceptible to treatment will be evacuated to the rear within 24 hours for evacuation from the target. The patients who are moderately severe cases and those having acute battle reactions showing a typical clinical picture (tremor, amnesia, startled pattern) are treated at the field hospital. To care for these patients each field hospital will have a special 50 bed set-up to take the load off the hospital.

One psychiatrist and four qualified enlisted men will be in charge of this set-up. The treatment given at the field hospital will be general, as in the clearing company, plus special techniques such as narcosynthesis or hypnosis for mental catharisis, living through of battle experiences, and recovery from amnesia. The patients will be kept at the field hospital for about 5 days.

A casual camp will be set up to hold patients who need additional 3 or 4 days because, despite the fact that their symptoms have disappeared, they are not ready to return to duty.

A further screening is also accomplished at the field hospital and those cases which it is felt are not ready to return to duty are speedily evacuated from the target.

The treatment at the field hospital includes group psychotherapy. This is simply a discussion by an individual patient in front of a whole group of his emotional reactions in order to demonstrate to the other individuals that their fears, anxieties, feelings of being yellow, and guilt reactions are universal rather than unique. The second phase is the retelling of his individual experiences by the soldier followed by a discussion by the whole group.

The purpose is to create a group attitude which will fix in their minds the realization that the hospitalization is primarily a means for restoring a soldier to duty rather than a pathway to evacuation. These group discussions serve to relieve individual feelings of guilt and stigmatization. Men will recognize that treatment can reestablish their self-confidence and ability at the target area.

The senior consultant has arranged to have a moving picture made at the target during the operation which will show every phase of the plan, from the time a psychiatric case is brought in to the battalion aid station to the evacuation of those patients whom it is felt must be removed from the target. Part of this movie, the field hospital phase, is to be sound.

4. Results. The plan produced excellent results early in the operation. One division, although it has had previous combat experience, had not undergone intensive enemy artillery shelling. By L + 7, 17% of the medical patients in the division were psychiatric cases. None had to be evacuated as the treatment proved so successful that in most instances the men were very anxious to rejoin their outfits.

(f) Naval Underwater Demolition Teams.

Mission. The teams were to reconnoiter the approaches to all assigned beaches, remove natural and man-made obstacles and antiboat mines to facilitate the landing of troops and materiel. Specifically, they were given 8 distinct tasks:

1. Reef Conditions: Data, such as the distance of the reef from the beach, depth in feet from the reef to the beach, condition of the reef itself, and 10 other vital characteristics were to be obtained.

2. Man-made Obstacles. The type, size, location, number of rows, spacing, intervals, and any evidences of mining were to be reported.

3. Natural Obstacles. All data possible was to be secured regarding these obstacles.

4. Estimates as to the time and ability to remove

obstacles were to be submitted.

5. Surf conditions were to be reported.

6. Onshore beach conditions were to be reported.

7. A data chart covering the above was to be completed and submitted.

8. Any other information of value was to be reported.

Organization. An underwater demolition team consists approximately of 7 officers and 65-70 enlisted men. It is designed in general to take care of one beach. The men are all volunteers who are expert swimmers, and show an aptitude for demolition work and who have a working knowledge of landing craft characteristics. They must be able to make accurate charts, obtain correct required data for the charts, and estimate the suitability of the beach for various types of landing craft.

Employment. A minimum of one pair of swimmers were assigned for every 100 yards of beach with a minimum of two pairs for any one beach. For each beach an additional pair of swimmers were to reconnoiter the edge of the reef, working parallel to the beach. Swimmers were to carry two-hour delay mine exploders to destroy any mines found. Units were embarked in APDs (High Speed Transport). LCPRs (Landing Craft Personnel (Ramped)) were to be used for the work parties. Each LCPR had 1 officer in charge, an SCR-610 radio and operator, visual signalling apparatus and signalman, and the usual standard boat equipment. At "R" hour the landing craft were to reach the line of destroyers, headed for the beach for the reconnaissance of demolition operations. At "P" hour the landing craft were to proceed in to pick up swimmers. At "K" hour the fuzes were to be pulled in the demolition operations. At "X" hour the landing craft were to be on the destroyer line on their way out from the shore. The above schedule was to be a daily rigid affair.

Results. Underwater demolition teams did their work for the 77th Division landings on the Kerama Retto and on L-4 commenced reconnaissance of the Okinawa beaches. From L-3 to L-1 demolitions work was executed. On "L" Day the demolition personnel reported to the control parties to assist the leading waves of troops to the correct beaches.

After "L" Day [illegible] necessary demolition work was done. The mission was accomplished, according to all reports, in an excellent manner. Posts which were placed in the reef by the Japs and which had attached demolition charges set to go off when landing craft hit them were successfully removed.

10. Training Phase.

a. Combat training was an impossibility for several reasons and none, except a little firing and patrolling, was conducted. First, the men were worn out from the Leyte Campaign. The XXIV Corps had to unload 32 ships commencing 20 February. The Corps was relieved from combat on Leyte on 10 February by X Corps, had to move from the west to the east coast and carry out GHQ orders and work on the unloading. Then the ships had to be reloaded. Four supply dumps had to be organized. GHQ tapped Corps for details continually involving thousands of men, hence no intensive training for the Okinawa Operation was possible.

b. Schedule of Events.

(1) 14 March 1945.

(a) AM: All ships completed loading of troops, equipment, and supplies. Destroyers of fire support units four and three conducted scheduled AA practices.

(b) PM: Transport groups moved by group from loading anchorages to transport areas, conducting AA firing practices enroute. Tractor groups moved by groups from loading anchorages to LST areas.

(2) 15 March 1945.

(a) Support craft made dummy firing runs.

(b) Tractor groups conducted AA practice firing.

(c) Transport groups conducted fighter direction exercises and tracking exercises on planes towing sleeves in simulated strafing, bombing, and torpedo attacks. Ships did not fire.

(3) 16 March 1945.

(a) Transport and tractor groups made time runs to their areas.

(b) Full scale landing of assault regiments conducted with gunfire support ships and craft and aircraft simulating gunfire and air support.

(c) Reserve regiments were boated, taken to line of departure, but not landed.

(d) Smoke screen laid covering the beaches.

(4) 17 March 1945.

(a) AM: Transport group commanders and other task group commanders held critiques. Destroyers of fire support units one and two held AA firing exercises.

(b) PM: Commander, Southern Attack Force held critique for task group commanders. Ships held tracking drills on sleeve dry runs, but did not fire. LSM group conducted scheduled AA firing practices.

(5) 18 March 1945.

(a) Tractor troops conducted scheduled AA firing.

(b) Taken up by individual ships to correct deficiencies noted on rehearsal and also for individual drills such as fire and emergency drill, boat group drill.

(6) 19 March 1945.

Same as 16 March 1945 except that the smoke screen was not laid.

(7) 20 March 1945.

(a) AM: Reembarkation of troops completed. RCM and rocket support units and LCS (Landing Craft Support) units conducted scheduled AA firing exercises.

(b) PM: Individual ship critiques were held.

(8) 21 March 1945.

(a) AM: Ships moved to logistic anchorages or other anchorages as directed.

(b) PM: Commander, Southern Attack Force held a critique aboard his Flagship for all task group commanders.

c. Comments on Rehearsals.

(1) Troops landed, moved inland only to a distance sufficient to clear the beach proper of assault troops.

(2) The field artillery and 97th AAA Group did not land troops or equipment.

(3) Corps shore party did not land troops or equipment but observed the functioning of division shore party operations.

(4) Assault waves were landed on the following schedule:

Wave 1 – H hour.
Wave 2 – H + 2 minutes.
Wave 3 – H + 6 minutes.
Wave 4 – H + 12 minutes.
Wave 5 – H + 18 minutes.
Wave 6 – H + 24 minutes.

Thereafter as desired by division commanders.

(5) The first wave was the Amphibious Tank wave.

(6) Although no naval gunfire, aerial bombardment or strafing was done during the rehearsal, drill requests were made for naval gunfire and air support in order to test communications.

(7) Each division had available 20 tons of dummy cargo for use during the rehearsal.

(8) The landing rehearsals were made on the same beaches used by XIV Corps in its original landing on Leyte, in the Rizal–Tarragona area. No appreciable reefs are off these beaches.

(9) The 77th Infantry Division landed its assault units, reembarked, and landed on another beach in rehearsal for its special island-hopping missions. Areas used were from Sogod Point to Pandan Point on Leyte. They used the Operation Plan I-Kerama Retto-Preferred Plan on 13 March 1945, and then Operation Plan IV-Ie Shima-Preferred Plan on 14 March 1945.

(10) The rehearsal in general was very unsatisfactory in the opinion of the troop commanders. Control of the small craft was lost and the amphibious phase of the assault landings ruined the chances of the troops gaining any idea as to the procedures to be used upon landing on Okinawa. The actual landing on Okinawa, however, was just 100% better than the rehearsal, as far as the amphibious phase was concerned.

11. THE OPERATION.

a. The 77th Division cleared the islands of the Kerama Retto according to plan, encountering only light opposition. Several hundred Japanese suicide boats, loaded with high explosives and designed for ramming our trans-

ports and combat ships, were captured and destroyed.

b. The trip from Leyte was uneventful, except that the convoy had to skirt around a hurricane for several days and as a result many soldiers were seasick.

c. The weather on L Day was perfect for the landings. It was a clear day and there was little or no surf. Visibility was limited over all the landing beaches due to heavy smoke and a dust haze.

d. The landings made by the assault battalions were excellent. The boat employment plan was carried out to the letter with one exception - every wave was eight minutes late - but as the interval was still as planned the waves hit the beach properly. The seawall was well breached by the naval fire support groups, the underwater obstacles removed by the underwater demolition teams, and the troops proceeded inland very quickly.

e. The Marines had taken the Yontan Airfield against light resistance by 1130 on L Day and by 1600 were 3500-4000 yards inland.

f. The XXIV Corps had secured the beaches and taken Kadena Airfield by 1240. By 1600 on L Day forward elements were 5,000 yards inland. By the close of the day the 711th Tank Battalion (M), all infantry troops of the assault divisions, all division artillery, and two batteries of AAA automatic weapons were ashore. The 420th FA Group had completed their landing on Keise Shima and had been registered by 0800. By 1354 an air strip on this island was ready for liaison planes. The Group L-5 plane was successfully launched from an LST (Landing Ship Tank) equipped with Brodie launching and landing equipment. High performance planes were used for fire adjustment.

g. On L + 1 the III Amphibious Corps continued its advance east across the island against light opposition, advances being made approximately 5,000 yards inland from the landing beaches. Naval gunfire support was employed in support of the 96th Division to the south as they were getting the only real opposition. The 7th Division of the XXIV Corps reached the east coast while the 96th Division was pushing south and southeast. At the close of the day, the XXIV Corps had troops occupying the high ground overlooking Katsuren Wan as well as the high ground 1500 yards south of Sunabi, and had control of all east-west roads in its zone of action. General cargo unloading over the corps beaches progressed rapidly under excellent conditions. The 225th and 145th FA Battalions, both 155 howitzers, were landed in action. Resistance was stiffening in the south.

h. On L + 2 the Marines reached the east coast and secured the neck of the Katchen Peninsula. Naval gunfire and air support continued for the 96th Division. The XXIV Corps reached the L + 10 line and in the three days had taken from the enemy 30 square miles of territory and killed 833 Japs.

i. L + 3 saw several changes. Although the unloading of assault shipping was approximately 72% complete, Jap suicide planes began to attack the transports in earnest and many were hitting their targets. These attacks

continued to be daily occurrences and much valuable time was lost as far as unloading was concerned. Jap planes came over at night also, usually in pairs, and bombed the transport area. Jap resistance stiffened on land in front of the XXIV Corps. Our troops hit well organized and camouflaged positions including caves, trenches and dugouts. The Jap artillery came into play with interdiction, harassing and counterbattery fire, not the single gun fire which our troops had encountered in previous operations.

j. On L + 4 weather conditions took a turn for the worse. High surf wrecked the ponton barge piers and broached several LSTs. While the III Amphibious Corps kept pushing on up the island, the XXIV Corps ran into an OPLR (outpost line of resistance) of a defensive position further south extending along the hill masses from just north of Yonabaru Airfield through Kochi and north of Shuri to the west. A counterattack of approximately company strength supported by three tanks was repulsed by the 16th Division. Jap artillery, mortar and machine gun fire increased in intensity.

k. On L + 5 the 7th Division drove in the Jap OPLR and reduced a strong point 1000 yards west of Ukuna which consisted of blockhouses carved out of solid rock, innumerable caves and pillboxes, an extensive trench system, and inverted double apron wire. The 96th Division also hit the main Jap defenses and was slowed down. Air raids increased in intensity and, unfortunately, the Jap suicide planes gained a great deal of success in their attacks upon our transports. Unloading was delayed for 48 hours due to heavy surf and continuous air raids.

l. On L + 6 the III Amphibious Corps still continued to move up toward the northern tip of the island with little or no opposition. The XXIV Corps was confronted with the job of reducing a heavily defended Jap line across the island which had numerous caves, wire, mines, AT and machine guns. It was found that as maneuvering by units of any size would be impossible, the infantry would have to go in and dispose of each cave in order to allow our troops to advance. Tanks were used, but too many well camouflaged and protected antitank guns and too many mines precluded their aiding the infantry by either rushing the cave, sealing it with a tank dozer, or burning out the occupants with the flamethrowing tank. At this point, therefore, the action became small unit action, with our artillery, air and naval support ships trying to soften up the Jap defenses by continuous shelling and bombing. The 1st and 6th Marine Division Artillery was moved south to support the XXIV Corps as they had no suitable targets in their own sector. This situation on land continued to remain much the same for the rest of the period covered by this report. The crucial areas were the transport areas, the beaches and the shore party installations. Jap suicide planes continued their attacks with success. Naval AA began to fall on the beaches, dumps and troops near the beaches as the Jap planes began to come over the beaches from the land side. Our troops received casualties, an ammunition dump ashore was hit by AA and blew up, a gas dump was lost and several friendly planes were destroyed. Unloading was not proceeding as satisfactorily as desired. This condition also continued during the rest of the period covered by this report. For a description of the Jap defensive system and infantry methods of reducing it, see G-3 Comments - Infantry.

[redacted]

12. COMMENTS.

a. G-1.

(1) Officers. Men winning battlefield promotions have, nearly without exception, proven themselves very satisfactory to company commanders. They are usually excellent platoon leaders, but are lacking in knowledge of supply, administration, etc. Several officers suggested that these new officers be afforded an opportunity to broaden their knowledge. Basic course such as that given by TIS (The Infantry School) was suggested, with the school being out here some place where the officers could be sent for the course while their units are in a rest area between campaigns. OCS officers are well thought of here. The units need an overstrength in lieutenants but don't have it.

(2) Manpower is really efficiently utilized due to necessity. Service units are combed, worn out doughboys transferred to these service units in place of those combed out and found able to do the job of combat soldier. In one division, this is done by an officer of the service unit and a line officer getting together, interviewing each other's candidates, and reaching a satisfactory agreement. Then the G-1 puts out the transfer order and all concerned are satisfied.

(3) WACs are serving at GHQ on Leyte. The officers I spoke to included medical officers and all said they should not be there. Night bombing is prevalent and they get nervous. Sickness is also a problem. Opinion generally is that they should be further back, on Oahu, for example.

(4) Entertainment is a big thing in this theater as there are no towns to visit, no place to go. At Leyte movies were held nightly and seemed to be satisfactory both in quantity and quality. Newspapers are prevalent and are well received. After the landing on Okinawa, the 96th Division had their newspaper out by L + 3 and the Division was in the line from the start.

(5) Rotation. In this theater the policy is that a man must serve overseas for 36 months before he is eligible for rotation. But he is still not certain of getting home. Rotation works slowly, is very limited in the number rotated, and doesn't aid in morale. The XXIV Corps went to Okinawa with a shortage of 3,000 men, so one can see the difficulty of rotation. Without exception, every officer and enlisted man questioned about rotation seemed to feel that the Army has let them down in this respect. Seeing Air Corps personnel rotated after 18 months doesn't help either.

(6) One division has officers in it who have reached the limit of their capability. A major, for example, who won't make a battalion commanding officer because he isn't a leader, but is a fine administrative officer. It is contended that higher units should have a hole for such men and take them from the divisions with a minimum of paper work.

(7) The division needs a replacement battalion of its own, especially when it's participating in amphibious operations. Then the troops could be training while details such as ship labor, shore party and supply working parties could be drawn from the replacement battalion.

(8) Division commanders are very liberal in the matter of awards and decorations. They are scraping the bottom of the barrel now and everyone seems satisfied.

(9) All divisions and the corps here have attached officers, such as observers, CIC teams, PI teams, etc. For example, XXIV Corps is feeding 120 extra officers. It is felt that some provisions should be made in these headquarters for additional orderlies, cooks, etc., as usually the headquarters is taking care of twice as many officers as their T/O calls for.

b. Comments G-2.

(1) Most S-2's and G-2's thought surrender leaflets were excellent sources of propaganda. However, they said that ridicule of the Jap Army, Navy or Air Force by our use of cartoons or otherwise should be avoided. Captured diaries proved ridicule a hindrance rather than an aid to our effort.

(2) It was recommended by one division that Nisei, not Whites, write the propaganda leaflets as they were found to write more effective. The reason for the difficulty in getting the Jap to surrender lays in the fact that he doesn't know it exists. Long range propaganda should seek to inform the Jap that it does exist, and then when he is attacked, more surrenders will occur.

(3) Aerial photo interpretation for Okinawa was done at division by 2 officers and 5 enlisted men. The straight T/O and T/E seems adequate.

(4) Vectographs were not used. Divisions are badly in need of a portable lithograph machine as they now use the engineer reproduction truck under G-2, G-3 control.

(5) Photo reconnaissance prior to the landing was in general excellent. Good verticals of 1/10,000, 1/12,000, 1/15,000

and 1/5,000 were received. The largest shares were 1/10 and 1/15 thousand. The operation map used was accurate within 10 yards (and it was made from aerial photos).

(6) Obliques and low color photos were taken and proved very valuable. Sufficient copies of all prints were received.

(7) G-2's are unanimous in their opinion that in amphibious operations a division must have at least 1 an 1/2 times the number of basic operation maps as set up in the book.

(8) The Japs are apparently not at all security conscious. Officers will be up in the front line with corps orders, for example. Stress, therefore, should continually be placed upon the importance of our troops turning in captured documents promptly.

(9) The units have authorized certain souvenirs, but any written material must be turned in promptly, and as a result souvenir collectors present no great problem.

(10) For the Okinawa Operation, two terrain models were received by divisions, one of 1/25,000 and one of 1/7,000. These were only good for broad orientations. A 1/10,000 of beach areas was issued to battalion headquarters.

(11) Every effort is made to use only those countersigns having a pronouncable "L" in them.

(12) Captured enemy documents showed that enemy G-2 work isn't too good. Their G-2's seem to think along patterns continually. They are dense-minded. Their spies and 5th column system is reported to be quite comprehensive and efficient.

(13) Many comments were voiced as to the T/O of intelligence sections by qualified officers. They believe that the intelligence and reconnaissance platoon in the infantry regiment should have the same ratings as a rifle platoon. It is a fact that their percent of casualties are just as high. The regimental S-2 should have a staff or technical sergeant instead of a corporal for his assistant. All the battalion sections need increased ratings. Battalion intelligence personnel should be the best field soldiers in the battalion. Their work requires plenty of guts, common sense and knowledge of basic military subjects, such as map reading, scouting, patrolling, etc. Often they are the "jacks of all trades" in the battalion.

(14) One division maintains that the number of interrogators given to the division is hopelessly inadequate. Each battalion commanding officer needs one. The G-2 stated that a thousand instances could be cited where lives could

have been saved if prisoners could have been interrogated right at battalion.

(15) Specialists, like OB teams, PI teams, it is felt, should be organic in division G-2 sections.

(16) The need is felt here for good Nisei officers with Nisei enlisted men. The Nisei try hard, but don't seem to have the necessary military background to be able to appreciate what tactical information is desired. They don't automatically get it, but have to be "kept on the track" during interrogation by one of the G-2 officers.

(17) By Tenth Army directive, no officer PW was to be embarked under any circumstances, except upon authority of G-2, Tenth Army.

(18) Patrolling is a big problem and the 77th Infantry Division has a good system to avoid confusion and to facilitate communication. Daily assignments within the division are made by division. A block of patrol numbers is given to each regiment. The regiments initially furnish division with the size, type, destination and route of each patrol. Thenceforth, the patrols are referred to only by their number in messages and reports.

(19) Opinion here by qualified officers is that training in scouting and patrolling back home should have its emphasis placed on patrols of platoon strength and larger. Everyone in the infantry regiment should have this training, as after organized resistance is broken and sweeping begins, everybody, including headquarters and HW personnel should be capable of taking their turn. Sweeping, especially in the mountains, is very fatiguing, and the riflemen have to have some relief. In Leyte and again on Okinawa, for example, a whole division practically was engaged in sweeping. Mounted patrols are not used by infantry, as a rule.

(20) In the 7th Division piper cubs were made available to regiments for patrol work. They were used to inform the commanding officer where the patrols were and worked with the patrol by radios. Several officers stated that in their outfit the primary role of cub planes was to work with patrols, while observation, reconnaissance and communication was a secondary matter. This, of course, refers to the "sweeping" phase of the operation.

(21) The opinion prevalent here is that units can't spend too much time on scouting and patrolling. Back home units should stress the importance of proper reports of patrols. Artillery forward observer should always accompany patrols, even in training. Everyone, including the reconnaissance

troop should be trained in fire adjustment. There is a definite weakness in sketching ability and poor maps make sketches a necessity. On Leyte, for example, maps were utterly worthless for small unit use and they had to rely solely on sketches.

(22) Training must be improved in map reading. The soldier must be made to understand scale, direction, ground formations, and appreciate maps. More field training should be given. The soldier should be given erroneous maps, made to find the errors in them, and be sent out to the hills to correct them on the maps. A one week pack trip would help. Then the soldier will be able to get something out of a map, even if the map is erroneous. Without this training the soldier is too prone to consider the map worthless and throw it away.

(23) Opinion here is that sending out patrols of less than platoon strength is foolish. All patrols have to fight for information and a platoon can support itself, even at night in a perimeter.

(24) Men don't like night patrolling against the Japanese. Results aren't worth the efforts in most cases. One division doesn't use them at all.

(25) Several rocket aircraft with a bomb attached and which was pilot-controlled was found on Okinawa in one of the Katena airfield revetments. It is designed to be a suicide rocket glider.

Description: Rocket propelled, twin rudder, midwing, 15 foot wing span, 18 foot fuselage, well constructed. Aircraft propelled by 3 rockets, each electrically ignited as needed by the pilot by use of a switch in the cockpit. The aircraft is launched by a mother ship (thought to be a Betty). It has a bomb of approximately 2400 pounds which is the nose of the glider. Wings and tail are molded plywood, fuselage of metal and flush riveted. Bubble type canopy, model of Tony. No landing gear or skids were attached or in evidence. The control surfaces are extremely small. Air-low control surfaces are approximately 2 square feet. Cockpit instruments consisted of airspeed, compass, altimeter and inclinometer. Due to the weight of the aircraft and size of its wings and control surfaces, its estimated speed is between 550 and 600 miles per hour in its suicide dive. The bomb has 4 fuzes in its base and one in its nose. Two of the fuzes are straight impact, two are "all-ways" action. The pilot arms the base fuzes; the nose fuze is air armed. The bomb is approximately 28 inches in diameter and 6 feet in length.

(26) Until the XXIV Corps hit the main Jap defensive position on Okinawa, its division reconnaissance troops were aggressive, provided much valuable information, and operated "according to the book" in most cases.

c. Comments G-3 - Infantry.

(1) It has been found by all units in this Corps that the most efficient and least costly way to kill Japs is to let them attack at night. The Banzai attack is the ultimate in efficiency. The success of a unit here is measured in terms of how many Japs it has killed, so rather than promote night attacks on our part, the best solution seems to be to get a good perimeter defense and then get the Jap to attack. The Jap seems incapable of making a coordinated attack and his blind fanatic frenzy apparently prevents him from learning from his own errors. For example, the Japs attempted a night attack against one of our company perimeters, walked into our fire lanes, and were heaped up one on the other. A half hour later another attack was staged in the same spot and again was wiped out. It would appear that although perimeters were designed for jungles, the Jap night habits seem to make the perimeter a desirable feature of the night defense, without regard for terrain. Officers here will use it wherever they go.

(2) The only indication of any fear on the part of the Jap has been his concern over our counterbattery fire and he has indicated reluctance to fire his artillery a lot for fear of this retaliation. Captured documents brought out this point.

(3) Excessive moisture on these islands has caused the sound powered telephone to replace the SCR 536. As always when landing, the infantryman was loaded down. Several threw away their sound powered phones near the beach, but patrols were observed coming back later to pick them up. The value of the sound powered phone is appreciated.

(4) Everyone here likes the heavy machine gun and they are kept up with the battalions at all times. Occasions are rare when the light machine gun is used instead. They might cut down on the number of 81-mm mortars carried, sometimes, but never heavy machine guns. The heavies have proven their worth in night perimeters.

(5) 81-mm Mortars are used in battery, tied in with the artillery fire direction center whenever possible. Extra SCR 300s are used for communication.

(6) Dog platoons were used in the Leyte operation and again at Okinawa. The dogs seem to get sore feet easily. The

handlers do not have sufficient infantry training. The climate is bad on the dogs. Prior to Leyte, and again prior to Okinawa, dogs were aboard ship for long periods of time. The belief here is that infantrymen should be trained to handle the dogs, not dog handlers trained as infantrymen. On Okinawa one unit gave their dogs to the Military Government people to watch the civilians in compounds. In this way they get rid of them.

(7) Junior officers oftentimes complicate combat orders. They neglect to tell each specific squad what to do. Terrain appreciation is the biggest weakness. They forget about intermediate objectives which should be the next terrain feature, whether it be a road, ditch, hill, or edge of rice paddy. Fear of losing control causes bunching and therefore casualties.

(8) Oftentimes scouts were either improperly used or not used at all. In one regiment five platoon leaders were killed because their scouts were not out. The platoon leader must realize that he is not a scout, but must be in a control position constantly. A prevalent system is sending out half squads with a BAR as scouts. In doing the job of scouts the platoon leaders invariably allowed their support squads to get too close to the other squads and their ability to maneuver was lost. (This happened several times to companies and the tendency was to commit maneuvering elements too close in the flank).

(9) A regimental commander stated that OCS candidates should be indoctrinated more thoroughly in the use of scouts and the utilization of terrain. Most of them are basically well trained, but it usually takes 6-8 weeks before they get down to earth with their gold bar. Many don't seem to realize their responsibility soon enough. The NCOs commissioned on the field cannot be beat as platoon leaders.

(10) In night perimeters, wire was always strung 35-40 yards in front of the outposts to prevent the Jap from throwing grenades into the perimeter. The assault battalions always used perimeters because of the danger of Jap infiltration and perimeters were employed by all installations including the corps command post. These Jap peaceneal attacks were usually from 8 men to a company in strength. Trip flares worked fine. 60-mm mortar flares do the job but they were scarce. The entire wire area was booby trapped. The next morning patrols were always sent out to look over the area and invariably would find some Japs in trees, holes, and brush inside and outside the perimeter. Officers admit that the weakness of the perimeter is lack of depth and that when the Jap Army decides to fight as we do, we won't have enough men to cover assigned zones, but they still will use the night perimeter until sectors of re-

sponsibility are decreased considerably.

(11) All agree that the anti-tank company is useless. Although the 37-mm is good in mountainous terrain and against pillboxes, the infantry needs a hand carried weapon that is effective against tanks, pillboxes, and caves such as those found on Okinawa. The recoilless weapons were not yet in the Corps.

(12) No special sniper units were organized. Smaller units used their own methods and organization. Sniper posts were not used outside the perimeter at night but were always inside. The sniperscopes were used very successfully on Okinawa. When the Japs made a night attack, two sniperscope men fired tracers, and all the other riflemen fired at the point where the tracers intersected.

(13) Our troops used captured weapons whenever possible. An interesting fact is that the Japs apparently don't take very good care of their smaller weapons. Rusty rifles were numerous. However, they do take care of their MGs and keep them clean.

(14) On checking up on what was being done to make the soldier want to fight, to raise his fighting morale and make him hate, it was found that nothing was being done, as it wasn't necessary. The divisions were all battle trained. Soldiers had already seen their buddies killed or wounded. Soldiers had seen the Jap atrocities perpetrated on Filipino civilians. Those who didn't see these things heard about them very quickly. They heard about the church crowded with Filipinos who expected to receive instructions from the Japs, but who were butchered. They know that among the documents captured by the Corps was a Jap order confirming this. Further proof was given by the few who managed to eventually escape by hiding under the dead until our troops arrived. Our soldiers also saw many examples of Jap mainings and killings of Filipino civilians who happened to be on the road as the Japs were withdrawing. These atrocities are probably the biggest factor in proving to the soldier that he is fighting not human beings like himself but animals that must be destroyed. I talked to many officers and soldiers and everyone mentioned atrocities.

(15) Tommy guns were not used extensively, for they weren't necessary, and they sound too much like the Jap light machine gun.

(16) Everyone from the top to the bottom of infantry divisions want piper cubs as organic T/E in the infantry regiments and the division reconnaissance troop. At present divisions loan their artillery cubs to infantry regiments for recon-

naissance and control.

(17) Officers admit that although their troops have been in combat they still bunch up, crowd their bivouacs, gun and defensive positions. This tendency is the result of the Jap not massing his artillery in previous campaigns and the Okinawa Operation with Jap battery fire in mass is sometimes costly to us.

(18) The Jap to date has not been able to reorganize and counter-attack properly. Officers here are of the opinion that their overcoming this defeat may also soon prove costly to our troops. Our people don't have that "let's dig in for the counterattack that's sure to come" attitude.

(19) The cannon company will go and has gone up all over the front line when the tankers wouldn't. When the cannon company attempted indirect fire, results were only fair in accuracy. The troops don't have much confidence in their close support by indirect fire, but they are excellent in direct firing and nearly all the regimental commanding officers used them in this way. (Remember they are SPMs).

(20) The rifle units use 2 BARs per squad. They used it for Saipan, Leyte and Kwajalein, as well as Okinawa and find them especially good for night defense. They would like them in the T/E.

(21) SOP:

The following SOP was used by the 184th Infantry in Leyte and at Okinawa and worked very well.

(a) Forward Echelon.

1. Regimental commanding officer - 1 stenographer; 1 orderly, carrying radio; 1 bodyguard.

2. Regimental S-2 or Asst. S-2; 1 topographic draftsman; 1 radio operator (special service) carrying radio.

3. Regimental S-3 or Asst. S-3; operations sergeant; orderly from headquarters company with radio.

4. 1 or more messengers.

5. CO's or liaison personnel of attached, supporting and adjacent units.

(b) Rear Echelon.

1. Regimental executive officer; 1 clerk from S-1 section; 1 orderly carries radio.

2. Regimental S-1: sgt. major; 1 clerk, carries radio; 1 messenger.

3. Regimental S-2 or asst. S-2; 1 clerk carrying radio.

4. Regimental S-3 or asst. S-3; 1 clerk.

5. Regimental S-4 or his representative; 1 clerk carrying radio; 1 messenger who drives 1/4-ton truck.

6. Munitions officer (may be in rear area).

7. Battalions commanding officers or their representatives.

8. Regimental liaison officers.

9. Commanding officer, gas officer, surgeon, commanding officers antitank and cannon companies, or their representatives.

10. Headquarters commandant or 1st sergeant headquarters company.

11. I and R platoon leader.

(c) Orders and Reports.

1. Oral instructions, orders, telephone or radio conversations and all other actions relative to regimental orders are recorded by each person involved, reported to the regimental executive officer and a copy given the regimental S-1 for the unit journal. All actions and orders in the headquarters are cleared with the regimental executive officer or senior officer present as soon as possible, to avoid conflict.

2. The regimental S-3 is responsible for keeping all unit and special staff officers, attached personnel and liaison personnel acquainted with the situation at all times. A check list is used for this purpose.

[redacted] immediately any information regarding the following: "Attacked on time", "In position for attack", "Changes on locations of front lines".

4. All officers and liaison personnel notify the S-1 of their location within the regimental CP and upon entering or leaving the CP.

5. The S-1 designates two points in the CP where the following personnel or their representatives will be available at all times:

a. 1st Group: All Liaison personnel; CO's or representatives of attached, supporting and adjacent units.

b. Second Group: Reserve battalion commanding officer or his representative; CO AT company, CO cannon company; I & R platoon; regimental gas officer.

(22) Fire distribution. A reinforced platoon of a rifle company was on a ridge. Their next objective was a hill about 400 yards to the north. The ground was wooded. The LMG section was placed on the left flank of the ridge in position defilade. A section of HMGs were placed on the right flank. The BARs of the support squad were placed on the center of the ridge. One squad moved around the right flank, one around the left. The scouts were stopped about 200 yards from the objective and both squads of riflemen built up on their line of scouts. The LMGs moved forward to the left squad's new position. The squads then moved forward on signal from the platoon leader by squad rushes and took the position. The support squad was guarding the flanks and rear. 1 man was lost; 15 Japs killed on the position. It wasn't known how many were hauled away. All participants agreed that the success of the attack was due to fire distribution as well as shooting at likely spots, not waiting for targets to appear.



BARs of support squad

(23) The infantry-artillery teamwork is fine. The infantryman has confidence in the artillery and oftentimes will call for fires 50 yards from their front lines. One lieutenant, for example, had a 25-man patrol which included two 60-mm mortars. His flank guards were out. Suddenly the patrol ran into about 40 Japs. The Japs, as usual, immediately tried to outflank them. The patrol leader found that he was unable to break off and withdraw so he called for artillery on his position. The fire killed 10 Japs, wounded

four men of the patrol including the leader. The patrol was then able to break off and get back. This shows the confidence the infantry has in its artillery.

(24) The bazooka proved its worth when four Jap tanks came down a road, got through the front line, and could have gotten to the division CP and the beach but decided to turn around. Bazooka teams got to the road and knocked them all out in 3 minutes. The regimental commander whose line was pierced said that the 37s were ineffective. Bazookas also were used on pillboxes and a great deal of success was secured in placing the rounds in the pillbox embrasures.

(25) One platoon got a lesson in security and the hard way. The outfit was moving forward late in the afternoon along level terrain with high grass, preparatory to setting up a night perimeter. The platoon leader, a good leader according to his superiors, had two squads abreast in a V with himself at the point of the V. Suddenly 2 enemy MGs opened up in the rear. 3 or 4 men were wounded. Then another MG opened up on the right front. The platoon leader grenaded its crew. The support squad moved up. The lieutenant was wounded, ordered the platoon sergeant to move the platoon back. Just then the Japs assaulted, bayoneted the wounded, including the lieutenant and 8 or 9 men. The platoon got out. The next day they returned and found 6 MGs were in that area. If the scouts were out, if flank men were out, they would have discovered these MGs in depth. On another occasion, a lieutenant was moving a reinforced patrol of rifle platoon strength down a trail. The terrain was fairly open. He knew one of our outfits had been through here about an hour before, but he still had a good flank security out and had his scouts well forward. The right flank outfit hit what looked like 2 or 3 Japs. They moved in, wiped them out, then ran into 50 dug-in Japs. The lieutenant contacted the rest of his company and eventually all the Japs were cleaned out. This showed results of having security out properly.

(26) Jap infiltration, as distinguished from his night attack, is perfect, no matter what the terrain is like, or where we are located. Platoon and company perimeters are most effective against this danger. The artillery is a favorite Jap objective in infiltration. They too want sniperscopes for perimeters.

(27) One division has had a lot of success with dawn attacks. A platoon attacks, gets on the objective and remains there. The battalion is then brought up on this platoon. The idea is that surprise is usually gained and the Japs are caught asleep. Battalion attacks from the start don't usually

achieve as much success.

(28) Units being trained for combat in this theater should realize and be able to adapt themselves to the transition from fighting on narrow fronts and secure flanks and high concentration to the employment of units on wide frontages with no flank or rear protection and often with their line of communications to their higher headquarters cut.

(29) All rifle platoons should have included in their training program a platoon ambush and search course, and an attack over rough and mountainous terrain.

(30) Radio and wire sections in the infantry regiment should be given intensive training in maintenance and repair of equipment. Their ability to maintain their equipment in wet weather cannot be overstressed. The division signal company cannot adequately handle this problem, as with this extreme moisture present in the islands the problem is a daily affair.

(31) All rifle platoons in the infantry regiments here know how to properly handle rubber boats. These were used several times for reconnaissance by rifle elements.

(32) When a unit sets up a night perimeter or an all around defense on an objective, and the telephone wire goes out, sending only one or two men out to check the break is a costly and foolish move.

(33) Infantry training should include constant problems wherein one squad or platoon has to go out, in rough or wooded country if possible, and find enemy who are dug in or hiding. This sweeping, or scouting, should be realistic, with snipers firing at the searchers if they stumble onto positions instead of carefully moving up. An actual bullet whizzing overhead is a great training aid.

(34) The Jap has a nasty habit of running up to tanks with satchel charges, bangalore torpedoes or antitank mines and attempting to stay with the tank until both tank and Jap are destroyed. Infantry must be trained to work with the tank so that the Jap is killed before he reaches the tank. If he is killed after getting to a halted tank, the damage to the tank is usually assured. This is especially true in employing tanks in villages and towns. In one instance, two mediums and one light tank were lost by these enemy tactics.

(35) The enemy also has a [illegible] of hiding snipers [illegible] in under native shacks on [illegible] high ground [illegible] rice paddies. In several cases [illegible] elements, receiving fire from a shack, sprayed it with rifle, and then, assuming the enemy in the shack dead, closed in, and thereby suffered casualties

The base of buildings and shacks and huts should always be thoroughly sprayed.

(36) A good rule for riflemen is to immediately be on the alert when moving in the vicinity of graveyards, tombs, crypts or vaults. The vaults on Okinawa were formidable defensive structures. The infantryman should be acquainted with the types of cemeteries located in the place he is to operate.

(37) In constructing pillboxes, the Jap usually selects locations at the base of trees. Most of the pillboxes are well camouflaged by growing grass and weeds. They are low, but the firing slits are quite wide. If the rifleman looks at the base of large trees as he advances, he can pick out these pillboxes without too much difficulty. Those observed had corrugated reinforcement inside, a sheet of corrugated iron or tin around the interior, topped by sod and log layers

(38) Below is shown a typical plan of a night defense used by an RCT in wooded terrain.

(See page 36).

[redacted]

Primary Fire
81-mm

Primary Fire
81-mm

Normal Barrage
2 Btrys
F. A.



Primary Fire
81-mm

4." Mortar

NORMAL
CANNON CO.
75-MM
+105-MM

Schematic
Not To Scale

Enemy

[redacted]

(39) The Jap is adept at using reverse slope defenses. On one occasion a rifle company got to the crest of the hill with no resistance. The enemy had entrenchments on the crest and reverse slope. The enemy swept the crest with knee mortars and three machine guns. Our outfit could not move over the crest. Attempts on our part to flank the crest by moving up the side spurs met with failure. The position was eventually taken by containing the enemy, forcing them to keep in their holes by mortar fire and making a wide envelopment and surrounding the position, then moving in.

(40) In the night defense shown in Paragraph 38, all elements of the regimental CP were so arranged by the headquarters commandant as to form a full perimeter. All communications had to work from the fox holes and slit trenches, but the CP tent was erected at night and dug in so that work could be carried on and struck at dawn. CP groups were always kept on a 50% alert. Supply dumps were unable to keep up with CPs most of the time, hence had to protect themselves. They tried to tie in with other service troops or rear echelon units whenever possible, but regardless of number of troops in the area, they always set up their own perimeter which included 50 caliber machine guns on ground mounts. They, too, want sniperscopes.

(41) In cases of known enemy positions, infantry regiments usually deployed on a 2 battalion front. Lower units used squad columns or wedge with advance in line of skirmishers "sweeping" or making an actual attack.

(42) The light machine guns and BARs were used well up front while the heavy machine guns were employed for flank protection. This was the case in aggressive drives where our troops cut through and around the enemy. In small attacks by platoons and companies, heavy machine guns gave overhead support whenever possible.

(43) Tank crews must be thoroughly trained in infantry tactics so that they can anticipate the needs of the infantry. Here is where the cannon company has the edge on the tankers.

(44) Jap paratroop attacks and infiltrations have made CP defenses a "must", yet the duties of the clerks and other personnel at headquarters installations prevent their getting continuous training in CP defenses. Several high ranking staff officers stated that if a division CP could be set up and it was felt that its defenses were safe, the dispositions of the regiments in the division would be different. More people are needed in the defense platoon, at least double the present number.

(45) The Jap defensive positions on [redacted] and [redacted] for a new assault technique. They consisted of caves and tunnels dug into the sides of hill masses at different levels, some at the base, some in the middle and summit. These tunnels at times were 100 or 200 feet in length. The caves often contained camouflaged antitank guns. Wire was used, many mines were used. Our tanks could not rush the caves because of the AT fire and the mines. Bulldozer and flamethrower tanks usually couldn't get close to the caves for the same reasons. It, therefore, was necessary for the infantry small units to get to the cave and try to either clear it or seal it. The latter method was found to be quicker, less dangerous and more certain. Portable flamethrowers were of no use to clean out deep caves and tunnels. The technique employed differed from that used on the pillbox type of fortified area as these caves, pillboxes and tunnels were at different levels, dotting the hills on all sides, and were in most cases mutually supporting with few if any dead spaces. Air strikes and artillery shelling did minor damage as the Japs holed up during the bombings or shelling, dragging their weapons in after them, and reappeared when it stopped. The assault infantryman had to know demolitions. The job of cleaning out these positions is slow, laborious, and is a small unit job. Many officers recommended that the Infantry School develop and teach technique of cleaning out defensive positions in hilly or mountainous terrain as all reports indicate that the Jap used the same defense on Iwo Jima and Luzon as he is using on Okinawa.

(46) The Jap tactical wire on Okinawa was in the form of an inverted V with the vertex on the ground instead of the single apron type.

(47) Only one case of booby-trapping, other than those of the Jap suicide gliders, was observed and this consisted of a single prong antiboat mine attached to a phone in a cave. When the phone was cranked the mine was set to explode.

(48) Mines were used extensively. Yardstick mines were found in the vicinity of Katena airstrip and on roads. Aerial bombs were buried in pairs, several feet apart, with a metal bar over each nose of the two bombs so that when the tank track passed over the bar one bomb exploded under the belly of the tank. Some instances of the lighter type 96 mines were reported on the eastern coast. The Jap apparently is realizing the value of mines, oftentimes is using them in patterns, and is doing a better job of camouflaging them. The antiboat mines were also used by the Japs on Okinawa for antitank mines.

[redacted]

TANKS

(1) These comments are based on discussions with officers of the 20th Armored Group which was part of XXIV Corps both at Leyte and at Okinawa, as well as on personal observation of the tanks in action at Okinawa.

(2) Troop List of 20th Armored Group. See Inclosure No. 2.

(3) Tactics.

(a) Normal tank formations were used whenever possible. However, the terrain in many cases canalized tanks which made difficult any maneuvering and made infantry protection imperative.

(b) In the landing the amphibious tanks led, were followed by amphibious tractors, and in this way the tanks got infantry protection and covering fire by the tractors as soon as the landing was made.

(c) Amphibian tanks were used with success to support ground troops with overhead fire.

(d) Amphibious tractors were used in some cases for overland tactical movements which caused excessive wear on the tractors, especially in track parts. Results did not justify this employment.

(e) Tanks were used effectively to assist infantry in overcoming centers of resistance, clearing inhabited areas, and flushing Japs out of foxholes, caves, tombs and emplacements, but on Okinawa mines and mutually supporting antitank guns in the main Jap defensive positions made this employment of tanks very costly.

(f) The flamethrower mounted in tanks was a very effective weapon against isolated emplacements, defended buildings, and tall grass honeycombed with foxholes. In order to see the small, deep foxholes occupied by the Japs the grass was burned away to prevent the infantry from walking over them. Again, the Jap antitank gun and minefields made it difficult to move the flamethrower tanks close to the organized cave positions on Okinawa.

(4) Deficiencies in training given by the tank group commander of the Leyte and Okinawa Operations:

(a) Further tank-infantry training is necessary to develop closer coordination. Emphasis should be placed on small teams, rifle platoons and companies working with tanks.

[redacted]

(b) Training needed to develop and perfect artillery support for tanks in the attack.

(c) Training needed to develop coordination with supporting aircraft.

(d) Armored units must be further trained in infantry tactics to include attack and defense by an infantry company with supporting mortars, machine guns and artillery.

INFANTRY-TANK

(1) The SCR 536 is too delicate for infantry-tank communication. The SCR 509 is used for liaison with the CP of the forward unit, but not on the front lines. When SCR 300s are used with tanks the disadvantage lies in the fact that they have to go into the infantry nets. On Okinawa the SCR 509 had to be used but a better radio is desired.

(2) All the medium tanks have sound powered phones hooked on their tail ends. The disadvantage, according to the tankers is that they can't get the doughboy out of his hole to use it.

(3) The usual size of the infantry-tank team is one platoon of tanks with a rifle company. One tank company is attached to each RCT which attaches a platoon to each battalion.

(4) It is not feasible to have infantry ride on the rear of tanks here as there are too many snipers in depth.

(5) One infantry regimental commander stated that when tanks are used with infantry it is necessary that the tankers get the idea of mass employment out of their minds. Sections and platoons are used, not battalions. This comment was voiced by several other officers, battalion commanders, and a G-3 of a division.

(6) A definite procedure should be set up for target designation. The infantry rifleman designates targets by right front, left front, etc., while the tanker uses the clock system.

(7) Another fact that the infantryman should know is that he has to call the driver in order to give driving instructions, the gunner for firing instructions, etc.

(8) It has been proven here again that for best results, the tank commander and the infantry commander must get together

and decide on what they shall do. They should always have a limited objective. After taking the objective, they should get together again, decide what next to do, and be sure that the riflemen are informed of the new plans.

(9) Infantry guides should be provided to get the tanks up or they may not get up on time.

(10) When the objective is taken, tankers have the idea that they should go to a rallying point, and there head for the rear for re-supply and maintenance. They must be housebroken of this idea as it is not an ironclad rule.

(11) One regiment had tankers bivouac in their area and some of their own people over in the tankers area in order to promote closer teamwork through discussions, friendships, etc., before the units left for Okinawa.

(12) Tracers, smoke grenades and 81-mm mortar shells were used to point out the objectives and targets to the tanks.

(13) The Corps has good liaison party system for infantry-tank work that has proven itself in combat. The team consists of one NCO and six enlisted men. The diagram of the Tank Platoon Liaison Party is as shown below:



The NCO and 2 EM operating the 509 are furnished by the tank battalion. The 4 EM operating 536's are from the infantry division. The liaison party is attached to and trains with its tank platoon. In combat the liaison party operates with its tank platoon as an integral part of it.

Additional personnel are trained in the infantry division as replacements for the 536 to the extent that training permits.

Duties of the liaison party:

(1) To contact the supported infantry unit CO prior to the commitment of the platoon.

(2) Maintain liaison between the tank platoon leaders and the supported unit CO through the SCR 509 and liaison agent.

(3) Maintain liaison between tanks and the assault infantry platoon and squad leaders by transmitting to the tanks on the SCR 536, target designations and other directions to control their actions and movements.

(4) Coordinate maintenance and supply of the tank platoon by contact with the tank CO and the battalion CO's on the SCR 509.

(5) In the absence of infantry, guides the tanks to their attack positions.

(6) To render any possible advice and assistance to the infantry-tank elements with which they are operating.

The NCO and SCR 509 are located normally at the CP of the supported infantry unit. The two sections of 536 operators accompany the leaders of the assault units being supported and transmit to the tanks the target designations and other instructions as directed by the infantry leader. The 536 operators were responsible for transmitting target designations to tank crews in the following manner:

(1) Tank number.
(2) Movement required to engage the target, if necessary.
(3) Description of the target.
(4) Direction of the target (clock system).
(5) Range to target.
(6) Method of fire adjustment or designation, if necessary.

COMMUNICATION

Whenever available, 536's were mounted on each tank for liaison with the liaison party. In any case, 536's were mounted on each medium tank of the tank platoon. This totalled 45 SCR 536's. All 536's in each platoon were on the same frequency and each platoon were on the same frequency and each platoon had a different frequency. These 3 frequencies were used by each tank

company of the tank battalion. Sound powered telephones were mounted on each tank to provide direct communication between the infantry and tank crews when radio means were inoperative or not available.

AMPHIBIOUS

(1) The following plan was worked out by the 96th Infantry Division for the loading of all assault battalions and was completely successful. All concerned were well satisfied with the results obtained. The landing diagram outlined in this section was used as a basis by BLTs in planning their boat assignment tables, and for loading personnel on the assault LSTs.

(a) 1st Wave – The two assault platoons of each of the two assault rifle companies, with one assault platoon of each company reinforced with a section of light machine guns.

(b) 2nd Wave – The balance of the two assault rifle companies, 2 sections of heavy machine guns, artillery FO section, naval gunfire spotter.

(c) 3rd Wave – The balance of the heavy weapons company, shore party reconnaissance personnel, and the anti-tank mine squad.

(d) 4th Wave – Two assault platoons and light machine gun sections of the reserve rifle company, battalion A & P platoon and extra ammunition, advance elements of battalion CP group.

(e) 5th Wave – Balance of reserve rifle company, battalion AT platoon, battalion communication platoon.

(f) 6th Wave – Battalion medical section, regimental troops, equipment or supplies, advance elements shore party, combat engineers.

(g) Call Wave – One line mortar company per assault regiment (12 Dukws).

Boat teams were numbered from right to left within each battalion exactly as shown on the diagram.

(2) Loading of LSTs.

Three LSTs were available to embark the assault elements of each assault BLT and one LST was assigned to the Amphibious tank company supporting each assault BLT. These four LSTs were loaded in accordance with their LST load-

ing plan which is based on the following principles:

(a) The two assault rifle companies of each BLT are completely loaded on one LST along with the battalion commanders party so that:

1. Last minute briefing could be accomplished.

2. Liaison parties with the underwater demolition teams need return to only one ship.

3. Latest intelligence information and pictures need be dispatched to only one ship to reach all the assault forces in the BLT.

4. The 1st and 2nd Waves all come out of one LST thereby reducing the control necessary at the target in forming the assault waves in the right order.

Battalion personnel loading chart as used in diagrams on next page.

Unit	LST A	LST B	LST C	LST D
1 BLT		(416)	(199)	(311)
1st Wave		184		
2nd Wave		212		
3rd Wave			124	
4th Wave				143
5th Wave				123
6th Wave			55	
Unload Det			20	20
Free LVTs		20		25
2. Shore Party			40	
3. Am Tractor		75	95	85
4. AM Tank	180			
5. Cml Co.	150			
6. Dukw Co	36			
Total	366	491	334	

(3) There is a distinct time interval between naval gunfire support and the infantry artillery supporting fires. True, the amphibious tanks do provide immediate fire support, but their vulnerability and lack of training in good indirect fire makes their value doubtful. The 4.2 mortars usually can give support by H + 2 hours while the artillery in several instances came in with unit supporting fires by H + 4 or 5 hours.

Landing Diagram



(4) There is a definite need for separate shipping allocations to corps and army troops. The amphibious SOP for POA does not provide for transport division for corps and army troops and this defect causes difficulty in landing.

(5) At present the shore party commander and beachmaster operate by cooperation. If anything goes wrong, however, it is the shore party commander who always seems to get the blame. The Corps G-3 recommended that definite responsibility and command be given to one of the two men.

(6) At least one battalion of each shore party group should be trained and equipped for road construction and maintenance to relieve corps engineers who at Okinawa had to construct and maintain all roads from the water all the way in.

(7) Many comments were made regarding the fine equipment, particularly engineer equipment received by the Corps.

(8) It is felt by many that corps should have a corps engineer group and headquarters and headquarters company to operate division shore party groups and dumps, and later do road work; with this group under the command of the corps engineer.

(9) The Marines now have a corps service area for their amphibious operations.

d. Comments G-4.

(1) For Leyte and Okinawa, battalion dumps were established initially after landing, then regiment and finally division took over. A dump was established for each of the two assault divisions. When Corps landed, they dumped their impedimenta in either of the division dumps. These dumps remained under division control even when general unloading began. Thirty days' supply was mounted and unloaded in these dumps. When army came in, it theoretically took over the dumps, but actually Island Command took over as they were doing the administrative work for army. Actually, when army did take over, they merely took over control of the service troops which landed with the divisions. The tentative plan called for corps to take over the dumps by L + 2 to 3 and army on L + 5 to 7. After army took over, the supply system functioned "according to the book".

(2) Liaison Planes. The Corps had its T/E quota of 55. The planes are used for everything except bombing missions. They were employed for supply, evacuation and messenger service, in addition to their normal roles of reconnaissance and observation. In one case they were used to fly

50 caliber ammunition to our people. The Corps Commander uses them for control. Everyone is unanimous in the opinion that more are needed by infantry division units, with some in infantry regiments and the reconnaissance troop.

(3) All transportation was eventually to be brought to Okinawa as soon as possible. The plan envisaged having 80% T/E transportation for the target. The shortages in transportation seem to be not in 1/4-ton vehicles, but in heavy vehicles and engineer vehicles and equipment. The only excess equipment were tractors and bulldozers, and these were excess only because of the lack of shipping. Due to intensive air raids and shipping losses the transportation not taken in the assault lift will be left on Leyte longer than originally intended.

(4) Jeeps were used as ambulances in forward areas, but were found to be undesirable in the rear. 3/4-ton ambulances are desired for this rear area work.

(5) The question regarding special staff officers commanding units has several answers. In the Eighth Army, special staff officers do command troops. In the XXIV Corps they do not, but the responsibility of the special staff officer is clearly being increased and defined. For example, the corps shore party commanding officer is also the corps service area commanding officer and as such commands all service troops until army comes in and Island Command takes over.

(6) Specific salvage units are needed by corps. Until they are provided, service or combat troops have to be used and there always seems to be a shortage of service troops. For example, the band was the only unit available as emergency salvage troops. Provisional graves registration units had to be organized for Leyte and this, too, hurts the combat units. At Okinawa, however, QM graves registration units were along.

(7) The G-4, XXIV Corps stated that ships are being improperly loaded at the west coast. He cited a specific example of ships arriving off Leyte with Central Pacific and Southwest Pacific cargo on the same ship. In several instances the booms on the ships were unable to handle the cargo on them. It was necessary to move the ships 30 miles up the bay to a floating crane, and then bring the cargo all the way back again by lighter. Reports declare that the cargo is not marked efficiently. Apparently a person can claim a cargo and get it instead of the person or unit for which it was intended. He believes that the shipping designators don't meet the requirements and feels that the unit, both name and number, should be used instead. Because of these de-

ficiencies, much cargo originally intended for corps finds its way to Southwest Pacific dumps; 150 trucks, for example.

(8) Mess kits should not be items of personal equipment. Weight and sanitation being important factors, the infantryman carries only a spoon. Numerous officers have suggested that mess kits remain with the kitchens, be brought forward with meals, and then returned to the kitchens for thorough washing.

(9) Inasmuch as service company personnel in the infantry regiment often are called upon to take care of unit distribution, gasoline rationing, etc., more T/O personnel are needed.

(10) By Tenth Army directive not more than 40% by volume of each class of supplies was to be palletized. Water, ammo, rations, petroleum and medical supplies needed in quantity for immediate support was not to be palletized.

(11) General unloading began only on order of Commanding General, Tenth Army and went on 24 hours a day until completed. At Okinawa it began on L + 1, but suicide planes, the reef and a bit of bad weather delayed unloading considerably.

c. Comments - Requirements.

(1) Nobody here ever heard of recoilless weapons, and although several officers saw the Beano Grenade, it has not been issued in quantity here as yet.

(2) Armored units want an antiaircraft mount on the light tank, M5A1, that is modified so as to permit the tank commander to deliver effective ground fire.

(3) An auxiliary bilge pump drive is needed on all amphibious vehicles, whether manually operated or auxiliary motor operated. A motor would be most desirable which also would be capable of recharging the battery.

(4) In forward areas, troops run short many times of component parts. Major items usually can be obtained, but the lack of component parts such as field range parts, waterproofing kits, etc., sometimes make it necessary to junk the major item. Two points are to be considered in this case. First, vital equipment is lost in an amphibious operation where each piece of equipment is usually worth its weight in gold. Second, the wastage is running quite high, too high, considering shipping, distances from U. S., etc.

(5) Weasels are accepted by everyone as life-savers. They can go places nothing else can and so, despite their shortness of life, they paid for themselves. Each division had 125-130 weasels for Okinawa. They have been used for stream crossings, wire laying and evacuation of wounded Several regimental commanders were of the opinion that each regiment should have a T/E of 40 in this terrain of rice paddies and terraced fields. Maintenance, the big problem, should be an hourly affair by the driver rather than a 24 or 48 hour duty. Many officers believe that the weasel should have a winch. The main point to get across to the using unit is that the weasel supplements but does not replace the 1/4-ton jeep. When roads are available, the 1/4-ton is used.

(6) The sniperscopes were well liked. The idea of sending trained crews out to demonstrate new equipment and weapons meets with everyone's approval. They suggest, however, that these crews always include a maintenance expert. The sniperscopes are especially good in the perimeter defenses where the troops are sold on them.

(7) Among articles in T/O not wanted was impregnated clothing and decontamination equipment. One division had all that equipment turned in to the division chemical warfare officer. The thought is that it should be available at division, but not distributed to lower units.

(8) Inasmuch as SCR 536's are undependable, SCR 300's supplemented by sound powered phones and messengers are used. Incidentally, the SCR 300 range is reduced to 1/3 its original range after several days of combat due to excessive moisture. One regiment airs their SCR 300's each sunny day whenever possible. The "guts" of the sets are removed and dried.

(9) Two flamethrowers are in each rifle company, but as always there is a problem in personnel. The infantry wants a flamethrower with a longer range. They have to follow up the flamethrower attack on pillboxes and caves with demolitions as the pillboxes usually have baffles in them and in many cases Japs have hidden on the other side of this partial wall and were still alive. Inasmuch as some of the pillboxes were eight feet thick with dirt and sand, the best method or reduction still seems to be rolling an M-10 up to within 50 yards and using close-in continuous direct fire on the pillbox. On several occasions, snakes were successfully used against pillboxes.

(10) To date the Jap hasn't interfered with our employment of pyrotechnics and they are widely used. Colored smokes are used in conjunction with cub planes to coordinate

with patrols. Yellow was found to be best, [illegible] ple next in desirability.

(11) On Leyte when the rains came all vehicles were stuck. An ingenious NCO in the 184th Infantry took some weasel tracks, put them on the rear wheels of a 2½-ton truck, and the truck became the only movable one in the regiment.

(12) The blackout tent isn't liked very well due to its heavy weight, high silhouette, necessity for always digging it in (as far as lower units are concerned) and the fact that the windows leak both light and rain.

(13) In one division, sound powered phones were split in two, "C" ration cans were put on them, and 2 phones made from one. Aside from doubling the number of phones, they were desirable because they could be carried in an infantryman's pocket or attached by a hook to his helmet.

(14) The 10-in-1 ration is not considered suitable for the men in the front line, but it must be issued to them soon as possible as "C" and "K" rations for 2 weeks straight are not conducive to good morale. Sanitation, as far as the 10-in-1 is concerned, is the big problem. It was suggested by a group of officers that a small envelope of powdered milk should be included in the "C" ration can for the coffee. The "B" ration needs better seasoning, 2 or 3 types, if possible. The fruit bar seems to be a waste as most soldiers throw it away.

(15) The cushion socks (short) issued out here are faulty. Heat and contamination make for athlete's foot. The troops want a higher sock.

(16) The new field boat and new packs were well received.

(17) Fuel tablets were found to be worthless, but the canned heat square does the job.

(18) The T-6 Device for medium tanks (13 floats fastened to the tank) isn't liked by the tankers mainly because of the vast amount of shipping space they take up in an amphibious operation when space is at a premium.

(19) A vote was taken in one regiment on the merits of the one-man 60-mm mortar with all NCO's voting, and the pros and cons were equally divided so no conclusion was reached.

(20) All units here want none of the towed cannon in their cannon companies. Without exception they all want to retain their SPM 75s and SPM 105s in the cannon company.

(21) The packboards are excellent but more are needed. They are used to carry SCR 300s and a packboard should be issued that is specifically adapted for this job.

(22) The mess kit should be unit equipment, brought up with the rations. The mess kit should be modified or a cafeteria type tray (perhaps plastic) substituted for it. Everyone agrees on this. In all messing problems, never forget sanitation for a moment.

(23) A fingerlift should be devised for amphibious operations which will be of the tracked tractor type to lift pallets and load and unload them on the beach.

(24) Pocket knives are not recommended as an article of individual issue, for sanitary reasons. A spoon is all the soldier needs for food and he has a trench knife.

(25) Tanks need better flotation. The traction is not good and too many tracks are thrown.

(26) The cry here is universal for an eatable cracker to replace the present "C" ration biscuit.

(27) Amphibious operations have proven that there is a definite need for an accurate howitzer, say of 155-mm, on a gunboat, as naval gunfire support doesn't get defiladed obstacles and weapons defending the beaches.

(28) A definite method of telling friend from foe is necessary. Several officers stated that many Japs are missed as a result of this deficiency.

(29) The chief of staff of one division recommends gratuitous issues of Ingersoll watches instead of issuing expensive ones as parts and repairs here are impossible to get.

(30) In one regiment, all the inner portion of the switchboard B-72 were taken out of the case, and encased in an aluminum box. The plywood case and iron legs were tossed away. The reduced total weight was 31 pounds when the switchboard was waterproofed. The telegraph operators carried the repeating coils.

(31) The telegraph is used and liked. The usual net operates at about 20 words per minute. As the navy forbids any use of prearranged codes, radio and telegraph nets stick strictly to the division SOI.

(32) Critical items include W-130 wire and antennaes.

(33) Communication personnel don't like the heavy black rubber

bags they are supposed to use in carrying radio equipment as they are much too heavy. In many cases, the bags are thrown away and the lighter waterproofed barracks bags used.

(34) Some patrols were equipped with .22 caliber pistols, steel jacketed ammunition, and silencers. Results were good.

(35) In amphibious operations, when going ashore men will have what is called the common roll, consisting of a shelter half, blanket, tent rope, and "K" ration. They carry a strip combat pack which includes a poncho, jungle sweater and a pair of socks. As they are all the same, prior to debarking, the men can grab any roll. A standard common roll is desired by all units for this type of operation.

(36) There is a definite need for a portable instrument that the infantryman can carry with him on a cross country move and which, at the end of several hours, tell him where he is. In strange country that has no outstanding terrain features, in wooded areas, and without the aid of the stars, getting lost is a common occurrence. Also when two units are separated in rough country, a piper cub is sent up. The two units release smoke flares. The piper cub should have an instrument whereby it can secure the distance between the units.

(37) A larger ground coffee component of the ration should be issued to the troops according to one regimental commanding officer and his subordinates.

(38) Concertina were proved very satisfactory and should always be carried. A recommended initial issue is 80 rolls per front line battalion with 100% supply available every 30 days.

(39) Goggles, green lens, is such an unserviceable item that it is felt useless to issue it.

(40) Tractor D-6 with dozer is desired by infantry regimental commanding officers on basis of two per regiment.

(41) One regiment lists the following equipment as superfluous and unnecessary: heat tablets, shoe impregnite, protective clothing eyeshield M-1, glass, sun or goggle M1943.

(42) The comments below were obtained from Colonel Jensen, Commanding Officer, 10th Armored Group and are based on his comments and my observations and talks with other tank officers.

(a) The "K" ration was not desired. The individual stoves for each vehicle made 10-in-1 and "C" rations very desirable until the "B" ration was issued.

(b) The authorized footwear was not entirely suitable for swampy terrain and wet weather.

(c) The poncho was not sufficient to protect the individual from heavy rains.

(d) The duffel bag was not suitable unless it was handled with care, kept entirely dry and off the ground. Rotting and mildew present. One waterproof bag per duffel bag was insufficient.

(e) Armored units need a crosscut saw and a power saw in each company for clearing fields of fire, etc.

(f) Maintenance difficulties at Leyte and Okinawa centered around three assemblies; transmission, final drive and track. Contributing factors to the mechanical failures were swampy terrain, vehicle overloading, driving abuses, shortage of critical spare parts and a lack of thorough first and second echelon maintenance during the periods of intensive operation.

(g) HE, 75-mm gun ammunition was found to be more effective against the Jap light tank than APC as the latter would go through the tank but the former would explode inside causing total damage.

(h) Amphibian tractors evacuated wounded. Four litters were carried without inserts, while litter inserts made it possible to carry 10 litters.

(i) The Thompson Submachine Gun was found to be the best all around individual weapon for tankers.

(j) The only major deficiency in the medium tank was the excessive ground pressure w hich prevented the medium tank from negotiating the soft terrain. The smooth rubber track had no traction, the steel track was too heavy, and in mud, the rubber chevron track was little more effective than the smooth rubber track. The best performing track was the smooth rubber track with gousers on every other block.

(k) Marmite cans are desired for all armored units on the basis of 3 per company.

(l) Tankers want 12 grenades, hand, fragmentation for close-in protection.

[redacted]

RC Williams Jr
ROBERT C. WILLIAMS
Lt Col Infantry

5 Incls.
Incl. 1A - Overlay, Plan of Operations.
Incl. 1B - Overlay, Operations Sketch.
Incl. 2 - Troop List - Tactical Organization.
Incl. 3 - Pertinent Command Relationship.
Incl. 4 - Description of and Data on Target.

[redacted]



Plan of Operations
Okinawa

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
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N
Scale 1:100,000
OPERATIONS SKETCH
OKINAWA SHIMA
Inclosure 1-b
YONTAN AIRFIELD
29
CORPS RES
1
HAGUSHI
SEA WALL
KADENA AIRFIELD
KATCHIN PENINSULA
III
XXX
XXIV
7
NOZATO
RCT 382
Corps Res
96(-)
SAKUGAWA
HILL 102
SUNABE
FUENZAN
KOZA
KATSURAN-WAN
KUE
AWASHI
EAST CHINA SEA
CHATAN
L+3
L+5
L+10
NODAKE
MACHINATO AIRFIELD
MAIN JAP
URASOE MURA
DEFENSE
HILL 178
LINE
UKUNA
KOCHI
OUKI
NAKAGUSUKU-WAN
YONABARU AIRFIELD
SHURI
NAHA
YONABARU
Note: there are continuous reef along shorelines on both side of the Island.
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TROOP LIST

TACTICAL ORGANICATION

XXIV CORPS:

Maj. Gen. John R. Hodge
United States Army

Headquarters, XXIV Corps.

CORPS TROOPS:

XXIV Corps Artillery:

Hq & Hq Battery, XXIV Corps Artillery

PI Tm
PI Tm
PI Tm

287th FA Observation Battalion (part only in assault).
749th FA Battalion (8" Howitzer).
419th FA Group:
Hq & Hq Battery, 419th Group.
145th FA Battalion (155-mm Howitzer).
198th FA Battalion (155-mm Howitzer).
225th FA Battalion (155-mm Howitzer).
#420th FA Group (embarked with 77th Infantry Division).
#Hq & Hq Battery, 420th FA Group.
#531st FA Battalion (155-mm Gun).
#532nd FA Battalion (155-mm Gun).

97th AA Group:

$Hq & Hq Battery, 97th AAA Group.
EWT #4 (Detachment MAWS #7).
(Note: All AAA battalions initially attached to divisions will revert to 97th AAA Group when its headquarters is established ashore.)

Special Troops, XXIV Corps:

Prov Hq & Hq Detachment, Special Troops, XXIV Corps (if available).
Hq Company, XXIV Corps
MP Platoon, XXIV Corps
APO 235
PI Tm
PI Tm
323lst Photo Unit (CA)
Intelligence Service Organization
Intelligence Service Organization
L Historical Unit
JOB Tm
Base Censor Detachment

[redacted]

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[redacted]

224th CIC Detachment.
Civilian Correspondents Group.
101st Signal Battalion
1176th Engineer Construction Group:
$Hq & Hq Company, 1176th Engineer Construction Group.
$47th Engineer Construction Battalion
$1397th Engineer Construction Battalion
$1398th Engineer Construction Battalion
Prov Engineer Topo Platoon
$1901st Avn Engineer Battalion
71st Medical Battalion:
Hq & Hq Detachment, 71st Medical Battalion
644th Coll Company (Sep)
645th Coll Company (Sep)
394th Clr Company (Sep)
556th Ambulance Company (Sep)
$1st Platoon, 594th Quartermaster Laundry Company.
214th Mal Survey Unit
2d Medical Supply Tm, Type 4, 726th Medical Detachment.
377th General Surg Tm
366th Medical Service Detachment (-1 Ortho Tm).
Military Government Units:
$Detachment B-6 Military Government
$Detachment B-7 Military Government
$Military Government Camp Detachment C-2.
$1st G-10 Disp
$2d G-10 Disp
$3d G-10 Disp
$2d G-6 Hospital
519th MP Battalion (- Companies A & C).
4342d Quartermaster Service Company (- 2d Platoon).
2217 POA TQM Tm.

Corps Shore Party:

Prov Headquarters, Corps Shore Party
20th Armored Group:
Hq & Hq Company, 20th Armored Group (Detachment will remain with 1st ESB for shore party assistance). (NOTE: All Amphibious Tractor Battalions and Amphibious Truck Companies initially attached to divisions will revert to 20th Armored Troop when corps shore party commander assumes control of shore party operations).
$1st Platoon, 968th Engineer Maintenance Company.
$1088th Engineer Depot Company (-1st & 2nd Platoons).
1445th Engineer LS Maintenance Tm
$183d Ordnance Depot Company.
$Hq & Hq Detachment 504th Port Battalion.
404th Ord MM Company (part only in assault).
$Detachment, 363d Ordnance Maintenance Company (AA).
$521st Quartermaster Group:
$Hq & Hq Detachment, 521st Quartermaster Group.
$187th Quartermaster Battalion:

[redacted]

$Hq & Hq Detachment, 187th QM Battalion (Mbl).
$3754th QM Truck Company (-1st & 3rd Platoons) (less vehicles).

$492d Quartermaster Battalion:
$Hq & Hq Detachment, 492d Quartermaster Battalion.
$247th Quartermaster Depot Supply Co (-3d Platoon).
$244th Quartermaster Depot Supply Co (-1st & 2d Plats.)
$3008th Quartermaster Graves Regr Co (-four Platoons).
$3063d Quartermaster Graves Regr Co (-1st & 2d ").

7TH INFANTRY DIVISION, REINFORCED: Maj. Gen. Archibald V. Arnold United States Army.

7th Infantry Division:

*1140th Engineer (C) Group.
*Hq & Hq Company, 1140th Engineer (C) Group.
*50th Engineer (C) Battalion.
*104th Engineer (C) Battalion.
*110th Engineer (C) Battalion.
*1st Platoon, 1088th Engineer Depot Company.
$%502d AAA Gun Battalion.
%EWT #1 (Detachment MWS #8).
$%861st AAA Automatic Weapons Battalion.
$%Battery A, 295th AAA SL Battalion (-2d Platoon).
711th Tank Battalion.
776th Amphibious Tank Battalion.
*718th Amphibious Tractor Battalion.
*536th Amphibious Tractor Battalion.
91st Chemical Weapons Company (Sep).
*Supply Tm, 1st Prov Chemical Detachment
Co A, 519th MP Battalion *(1 platoon reverts to corps shore party).
$*644th Ordnance Ammunition Company
$*284th Ordnance Heavy Maintenance Company (Tk)(-Det in 1st Garr Echelon).
$*Detachment, 196th Ordnance Depot Company
204th Ordnance Bomb Dis Squadron
$*472d Amphibious Truck Company
$*481st Amphibious Truck Company
$*200th Port Company
$*291st Port Company
69th Field Hospital (reverts to corps control on order).
1 Ortho Tm, 366th Medical Service Detachment.
376th General Surg Tm
390th Neurosurgical Tm
52d Portable Surg Hospital
66th Portable Surg Hospital
5th Museum Medical Arts Service Detachment
$*1st & 2d Platoons, 244th QM Depot Supply Co (2d Platoon reverts to 96th Infantry Division upon debarkation).
$*3260th QM Service Co (Co less 1 Sec reverts to corps shore party).

$2d Platoon, 3008th QM Graves Registration Company
$*1st & 3d Platoons, 3754th QM Truck Co (less vehicles) (3d platoon reverts to 96th Infantry Division upon debarkation).
*1st Sec, 2d Platoon, 4342d QM Service Company.
$*191st QM Gas Supply Co (2d Platoon reverts to 96th Infantry Division upon debarkation).
40th Quartermaster War Dog Platoon.
*75th JASCO (Co less SFCPs and ALPs reverts to corps shore party).
2211th POA TQM Tm
3233d Photo Assignment Unit.
7th CIC Detachment.
JOB Tm
PI Tm
Base Censor Detachment
News Tm, 1st Information & Historical Service
Intelligence Service Organization
Civilian Correspondents Group
Detachment A-4 Military Government.
$Detachment B-4 Military Government
$4th G-10 Disp
$5th G-10 Disp

96TH INFANTRY DIVISION, REINFORCED: — Major General James L. Bradley, United States Army

96th Infantry Division:

*1122d Engineer (C) Group:
*Hq & Hq Company, 1122d Engineer (C) Group.
*170th Engineer (C) Battalion.
*173d Engineer (C) Battalion.
*174th Engineer (C) Battalion.
*2d Platoon, 1088th Engineer Depot Company.
$%504th AA Gun Battalion
%ET #3 (Detachment MAWS #8).
$%485th AAA Automatic Weapons Battalion
$%Battery C, 294th AAA SL Battalion (-1 platoon).
763d Tank Battalion
780th Amphibious Tank Battalion.
*728th Amphibious Tractor Battalion
*788th Amphibious Tractor Battalion
88th Chemical Weapons Battalion (Mtz)(-A Co).
*Supply Tm, 1st Prov Chemical Detachment.
Company C, 519th MP Battalion *(1 Platoon reverts to corps shore party).
$*632d Ordnance Ammunition Company
$*Detachment, 196th Ordnance Depot Company.
206th Ordnance Bomb Disp Squadron
$*474th Amphibious Truck Company
$*827th Amphibious Truck Company

[redacted]

$*204th Port Company
$*293d Port Company
31st Field Hospital (reverts to corps control on order).
Detachment, 233d General Hospital.
51st Portable Surg Hospital
67th Portable Surg Hospital
2212th POA TQM T m
$*3240th QM Service Company (Co less 1 Sec reverts to corps shore party).
*2d Sec, 2d Platoon, 4342d QM Service Company.
$3d Platoon, 3008th QM Graves Registration Company.
41st QM War Dog Platoon.
*593d JASCO (Co less SFCPs and ALPs reverts to corps shore party).
3235th Photo Assignment Unit.
96th CIC Detachment
JOB Tm
PI Tm
Base Censor Detachment
News Tm B, 1st Information & Historical Service.
Intelligence Service Organization.
Civilian Correspondents Group
Detachment A-6 Military Government.
$Detachment B-5 Military Government.
$8th G-10 Hospital
$9th G-10 Hospital

TENTH ARMY RESERVE DIVISION (ARMY)

(Information Purposes Only)

77TH INFANTRY DIVISION, REINFORCED: Major General Andrew D. Bruce
United States Army

77th Infantry Division:

1118th Engineer (C) Group:
Hq & Hq Company, 1118th Engineer (C) Group
132d Engineer (C) Battalion
233d Engineer (C) Battalion
242d Engineer (C) Battalion
$93d AA Gun Battalion
$204th Radar Maintenance Unit, Type C.
$7th AAA Automatic Weapons Battalion
$2d Platoon, Battery A, 295th AAA SL Battalion
706th Tank Battalion
708th Amphibious Tank Battalion
715th Amphibious Tractor Battalion
773d Amphibious Tractor Battalion
Company A, 88th Chemical Weapons Battalion (Mtz).
Supply Tm, 1st Prov Chemical Detachment
Company B, 724th MP Battalion

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$693d Ordnance Ammunition Company
$Detachment, 196th Ordnance Depot Company
92d Ordnance Bomb Disp Squadron
$477th Amphibious Truck Company
$828th Amphibious Truck Company
$203d Port Company
$292d Port Company
36th Field Hospital
Detachment, 75th Station Hospital
95th Portable Surg Hospital
68th Portable Surg Hospital
$2d Platoon, 3063d QM Graves Registration Company
43d QM War Dog Platoon
292 JASCO
2218th POA TQM Tm
323th Photo Assignment Unit
77th CIC Detachment
JOB Tm
PI Tm
Base Censor Detachment
News T m C, 1st Information & Historical Service
Intelligence Service Organization
Civilian Correspondents Group
$Detachment C-13, Military Government
Detachment A-5 Military Government
$Detachment B-9 Military Government
$6th G-10 Disp
$7th G-10 Disp
Prov Radio Intelligence Company (-)
Detachment 67, 7th Weather Squadron
Detachment Mar AWS #8 .
Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion FMF Pac (- Co B).

27TH INFANTRY DIVISION: Major General George W. Griner, Jr.
United States Army

27th Infantry Division:

1165th Engineer (C) Group:
Hq & Hq Company, 1165th Engineer (C) Group
34th Engineer (C) Battalion.
152d Engineer (C) Battalion.
134lst Engineer (C) Battalion.
68th Field Hospital
96th Portable Surg Hospital
98th Portable Surg Hospital
219th Mal Survey Company
122d Mal Control Company
$61st Ordnance Ammunition Company
95th QM War Dog Platoon
$1st Platoon, 3063d QM Graves Registration Company
594th JASCO

[redacted]AL

PI Tm
Intelligence Service Organization
Civilian Correspondents Group
JOB Tm
Tm E, TDY, 1st Information & Historical Service
27th Operation Tm Type 1
27th Hq & Adm Tm Type 1
$15th G-10 Disp
$16th G-10 Disp
$Detachment B-10 Disp

XXIV CORPS UNITS TO ARRIVE OBJECTIVE
SUBSEQUENT TO ASSAULT

$*Detachment, 284th Ordnance Heavy maintenance Company (Tank).
*968th Engineer Maintenance Company (- 1st Platoon).
$%866th AAA Automatic Weapons Battalion.
$230th AAA SL Battalion (-):
$%Hq & Hq Battery, 230th AAA SL Battalion
$%Battery A, 230th AAA SL Battalion
$%1st Platoon, Battery C, 230th AAA SL Battalion
%8th Signal Radar Maintenance Unit, Type A
226th FA Battalion (155-mm Gun) (If shipping is available).

TENTH ARMY UNITS TO ARRIVE OBJECTIVE
FROM LEYTE SUBSEQUENT TO ASSAULT

598th Signal Automatic Weapon Battalion (- Co D).
727the Signal Automatic Company.

Note: * Units to revert to corps shore party control when corps shore party commander assumes control of shore party operations.

% Units to revert to 97th AAA Group.

Reverts to XXIV Corps Artillery when emplaced.

$ Pass to Is commander on order of CG, Tenth Army.

[redacted]

PERTINENT COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

TF 51	Joint Expeditionary Force	Vice Admiral Turner
TF 52	Amphibious Support Force	Rear Admiral Blandy
TG 56	Expeditionary Troops	Lt. General Buckner
TG 56.1	Army Troops Hq. Tenth Army & Hq. Troops	Lt. General Buckner
TF 53	Northern Attack Force	Rear Admiral Reifsnider
TG 56.2	Northern Landing Force	Maj. General Geiger
	III Amphibious Corps 1st Marine Division 6th Marine Division	
TF 55	Southern Attack Force	Rear Admiral Hall
TG 56.3	Southern Landing Force	Major General Hodge
	XXIV Corps 7th Infantry Division 96th Infantry Division	
TG 51.1	Western Islands Attack Group	Rear Admiral Keland
TG 56.4	Western Islands Landing Force	Major General Bruce
	77th Infantry Division	
TG 51.2	Demonstration Group	Rear Admiral Wright
TG 56.5	Demonstration Landing Force	Major General Watson
	2nd Marine Division Corps Reserve RCTs	
TG 51.3	Expeditionary Force Floating Reserve	Commander McGovern
TG 56.6	Expeditionary Troops Floating Reserve	Major General Griner
	27th Infantry Division	
TG 56.7	Area Reserve	Major General Mueller
	81st Infantry Division	

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DESCRIPTION OF AND DATA ON TA[redacted]

1. The Okinawa Gunto, consisting of Okinawa Shima and numerous smaller islands, are located at the approximate center of Nansei Shoto. Central link in the chain which screens the China Sea from the Pacific Ocean, Okinawa largest and most important island of the Nansei Shoto, lies roughly at an equal distance from Formosa on the southwest, China on the west, and Kyushu, Japan, on the northeast. It is roughly 300 nautical miles from Formosa, 450 from Shanghai, and 360 from Kyushu.

2. Population of Okinawa is about 500,000. The people are racially a mixed group. The languages spoken are Ryukyu and Japanese. Farming is the chief occupation.

3. Okinawa is 60 miles long and averages 3 to 10 miles wide. Its physical geography favors defense. The northern two-thirds has rugged mountainous terrain bordered by dissected terraces which generally end at the coast in steep cliffs. An estimated 80% is heavily wooded. Troop movements would be difficult and vehicles, tracked or wheeled would find it difficult to operate off the roads. The southern 1/3 is generally rolling, broken, however, by a number of steep scarps and ravines. 80% is cultivated with sugar cane and sweet potatoes.

4. Nakagusuku Wan and Chimu Wan on east coast are the only substantial fleet anchorages south of Kyushu. Naha Ko, leading port of Nansei Shoto, has an inner harbor where vessels up to 3,000 tons can unload.

5. Population of leading towns (approximate):

Naha - 65,000; Shuri - 17,000.

6. The road system in Okinawa is developed the best in the south, but most roads are narrow making 2-way traffic difficult.

7. Communications include 8 radio stations, 1 (one) radio weather station and 1 (one) RDF.

8. There are six airfields including those on Ie Shima.

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ORGANIZATION CHART

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

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
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XXX
XXIV
97
XXX
SP
TRS
XXIV
HQ & HQ BTRY XXIV
INT 3 PI TRS
287 OBNS
749
419
HQ & HQ BTRY 419
148
198
228
420 (EMBARKED WITH 77TH INF DIV)
HQ & HQ BTRY 420
931
932
HQ & HQ BTRY 97
S MAWS 7
S MAWS 8
S MAWS 8
502
504
981
AW
485
INF
295 (60 PLAT)
294 (- 1ST PLAT)
D-C XXIV
D-7 XXIV
D-C O XXIV
D-C XXIV
D-C XXIV
D-C XXIV
D-C XXIV HQSP
PROV HQ & HQ BTRY XXIV CORPS (IF AUTH ORGN)
HQ & HQ CO XXIV
SP XXIV CORPS
A & S APO 636
INT 6 PI TRS
INT PHOTO (GS)
INT 8 SERV ORGNS
INT L HIST U
INT 400 TH
INT
INT
INT ARVL CORRES SP
S HQ
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
XXX
SH PTY XXIV
PROV HQ XXIV SH PTY
E 968 MAINT
E 1068 DEP (-1ST & 2D PLATS)
E 1068 DEP
E 1068 DEP
E 1446 MAINT TM
E 1140 (C)
E 1140 (C)
E 50(C)
E 104 (C)
E 110 (C)
E 1122 (C)
E 1122(C)
E 170 (C)
E 173 (C)
E 174 (C)
20
715 AMPHTRAC
536 AMPH TRAC
726 AMPH TRAC
786 AMPH TRAC
472 AMPH TRK
481 AMPH TRK
474 AMPH TRK
527 AMPH TRK
804 PORT
804 PORT
200 PORT
291 PORT
204 PORT
293 PORT
Q 2244 DEP SUP (-1ST & 2D PLATS)
Q 2244 DEP SUP
Q 3000 QR REQ (-4 PLATS)
Q 3000 QR REQ (-1ST & 2D PLATS)
Q 3290 SERV (-1 SEC)
Q 3240 SERV (-1 SEC)
Q 187 MSL
Q 187 MSL
Q 3784 TRK (-VEHICLES) (-1ST & 2D PLATS)
Q 3784 TRK (-VEHICLES)
Q 3784 TRK (-VEHICLES)
Q 191
S 968 MAINT (AA)
S 188 DEP
S 188 DEP
S 188 DEP
S 4342 SERV
S 75 JASCO (-SPCPs & ALPs)
S 593 JASCO (-SPCPs & ALPs)
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UNCLASSIFIED

2





UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

4

TENTH ARMY



APPENDIX A TO ANNEX I TO FO 48 A&B

5

RES DIVS (ARMY)



LEGEND:

[ ] UNITS REVERTING FROM DIVISIONS TO CORPS TROOPS

* UNITS TO REVERT TO CORPS SHORE PARTY

§ UNITS TO PASS TO IS COM ON ORDERS OF CG EXPEDITIONARY TROOPS

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

6